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THE MEANING OF ΓΑΡ

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTIES OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOLS OF ARTS, LITERATURE, AND SCIENCE, IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GREEK

BY

GENEVA MISENER

1904
The Lord Baltimore Press
THE FRIEDENWALD COMPANY
BALTIMORE, MD., U. S. A.

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PREFACE.

In this dissertation four only of the topics outlined at the beginning are discussed. The remaining five are reserved for later publication.

The subject of the dissertation was suggested by Professor Paul Shorey, Head of the Greek Department, University of Chicago, to whose critical supervision I am greatly indebted.

Rockford College,
November, 1904.

Geneva Misener.

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THE MEANING OF ΓΑΡ.

CHAPTER I.

After these many centuries of research it would seem probable that some final and generally accepted conclusion had been reached in regard to the syntax of so simple and common a particle as γάρ. Yet, save in the explanation of γάρ in declarative sentences, to denote causal relations between the sentence in which it occurs, and the immediately preceding context, opinions are still at variance. Concerning the uses of γάρ which remain, scarcely two commentators agree throughout, and many are diametrically opposed, as the brief historical review which follows will show.

Vigerius was among the first to attempt a somewhat systematic treatment of the particle. In his work "De Idiotismis Graecis" (p. 492), he divided the meanings of γάρ into these rather vaguely defined classes, (1) the common conception, (2) the ironical, (3) the interrogative. This last division was recognized also by Matth. Devarius (De Graec. Ling., Ed. Klotz, p. 52), and in addition an adversative force illustrated, he believed, in Aristoph. Peace 319.

Hoogeveen (De Particulis Graecis, 1806, p. 97), who was greatly in advance of his predecessors in methods of investigation and scholarship, pointed out the errors into which they had fallen, and suggested the following classification (1) causal, (2) inchoative, (3) ratiocinative or syllogistic. He offered tentatively the theory that γάρ may be composed of γε and ἄρα, but did not attempt to refer the meanings of the particle to its component parts.

Likewise Thiersch (Greek Gram., 2nd. edit., 1826), after stating with certainty that γάρ is composed of γε, ἄρα, made no further use of the etymology, declaring γάρ everywhere causal. In this he was supported by Krüger, whose Greek grammar appeared in 1842.

About the first to apply the results of philology in interpretation was Klotz in his edition of Devarius' book on particles. The syllogistic force which γάρ appeared to him to have in certain passages,—questions for example, was traced to the inferential ἄρα.

On the casual suggestion offered by his predecessor as an explanation of one meaning of the particle, Hartung (Griech. Partikeln, Erlangen, 1832, Vol. I, p. 457) based an elaborate systemization of all its uses. He distinguished two broad classes of meanings, one combining the argumentative γε and the expletive ἄρα, the other uniting the suppletive γε and the syllogistic or conclusive ἄρα.

This attempt, however, to explain γάρ by an analysis of its component parts did not—it seems—bring a final solution of the problems of interpretation. There was left, rather, a wider field of possible permutations and combinations of forces, varying with the subtle shades of meaning which could be discovered in these equally elusive particles γε and ἄρα.

Accordingly it is not surprising to find in the next important work on particles an altogether different rendering supported by the same theory of origin. Baümlein in his "Untersuchungen über Griechischen Partikeln, Stuttgart, 1869 (p. 68)", thus analyzed γάρ:—The γε contained in the particles brings into prominence the fact stated by the sentence, the ἄρα asserts that it is undeniably true. The original force of the compound would be that of emphatic assertion of a fact as indisputably true.

From this is developed the causal signification, because that which serves for the ground of another statement must itself be certain and granted. Although the causal predominates, there remain, he believed, traces of the primitive meaning in uses which were developed when the language was in a paratactic stage. These still continue in good usage along with the later force. He would, then, assign to the class of original γάρ, the γάρ in wish, in certain questions, in responses, in the groups, ἀλλὰ γάρ, νῦν δὲ—γάρ, καὶ γάρ and finally proleptic γάρ.

Kühner in his Griech. Gram., 2nd edit. (1870), part I, p. 724, accepted Baümlein's theory of origin and development, but did not include proleptic γάρ and καὶ γάρ among the original uses.

A reaction against this etymological method of interpretation appeared in the next work on the subject, Sernatinger's scholarly treatise "De particula γάρ (Pars I, 1874, II, 1875)", wherein it was set forth that, inasmuch as γὰρ and ἄρα are combined in Homer, the Greeks at that time had no conception of its origin, and the question must then be decided by a close examination of the relation of the sentences.

Sernatinger thus defined the function of γάρ: "Particula γάρ rationem reddit sententiae aut superioris aut insequentis aut cogitatione intelligendae", rejecting the theory that it is an affirmative adverb on the ground, that it destroys the continuity of the sentences by removing the logical connection. Such a loose style (εἰρομένη λέξις), as is necessitated by the hypothesis just mentioned, while occasionally found in all the Greek writers is, he insisted, an intentional imitation of daily speech or a force-giving device, and not a survival of a primitive period of language. The Greeks had passed beyond the paratactic stage long before the time of Homer, who shows great skill in sentence-formation.

This same writer likewise criticized at length Schraut's theory, that γάρ is restrictive in force and asserts, that whatever may be the truth about the preceding statements, the facts given in the γάρ clause are at least certain, pointing out that such modesty and restraint are not characteristic of men, least of all of the Greeks, in argument, where γάρ occurs most frequently. Apart from this subjective reasoning, he proved convincingly that in some of the instances of the original force cited by Schraut, the statement for which γάρ gives the reason cannot be otherwise than certain.

Among the scholars treating the uses of this particle in one author, Broschman, who published at Leipzig, 1882, an accurate and scholarly dissertation, "De γάρ particulae usu Herodoteo", should be mentioned. Objecting to Sernatinger's utter rejection of the asseverative force of γάρ, he supported Baümlein's theory of its development. His researches, however, in Herodotus led him to conclude that the particle bears a causal meaning in all instances in this author, except perhaps in wish (where the original signification has been obscured), and in the compounds τοιγάρ and τοιγαροῦν. The last, he asserted, are certainly relics of the earlier asseverative γάρ.

Kalinka, "De usu coniunctionum quarundam apud scriptores Atticos antiquissimos", Diss. Phil. Vind. Vol. 2, p. 149 fg (1890), adopted in part the hypothesis of Baümlein, in that he believed that γάρ has two meanings, confirmatory, and causal. His theory, however, of the development of the particle was the reverse. The causal force, he maintained, was the earlier, and the confirmatory arose through the gradual obscuring of the causal in certain uses, and then extended far beyond the original limits, through false

analogy, till finally its association with the causal meaning was forgotten.

The attempt to explain the uses of this particle in classical Greek by reference to its component parts γε and ἄρα would seem to be, at least, a fruitless, and, perhaps, a well-nigh impossible task, for admitting that it is in form derived from γε and ἄρα, the time of its formation so antedates literary Greek, that all consciousness of its origin was certainly lost before the time of Homer. This, the most ardent supporters of the etymological interpretation concede; for the evidence is almost conclusive: (1) The lengthened form γάρα is never found. (2) γάρ and ἄρα are frequently combined. (3) The different developments of ἄρα and γάρα, to which γάρ, in its original use, is supposed to have been parallel, are difficult to reconcile with the theory which holds that γάρ continued to bear throughout literary Greek a meaning similar to that of these particles, since γάρ and ἄρα are, in the majority of instances, the symbols of diametrically opposite logical relations —namely cause and sequence.

The differentiation in the meanings of the particles must have occurred in an earlier and obscure stage of linguistic growth, when the significations of the forms γε and ἄρα were still vague, having not yet been clearly defined by usage in a widely-known cycle of songs or poems. The causal force, then, had, without doubt, completely superseded the original force long before the age of Homer, who is, clearly, far removed from the early formative period of language, as Sernatinger has shown.

Baümlein's supposition that the causal meaning is a later development than the affirmative, is not substantiated by the relative frequency of the two uses in Greek literature. The so-called affirmative uses of γάρ, with the exception, perhaps, of γάρ in wish, are more common in the later than they are in the earlier Greek authors. The proportion of γάρ in question, for example, in Sophocles compared with Homer, is about 9 : 1. This increase, even allowing for the greater frequency of questions in dramatic dialogue, than in epic narrative, would seem to point toward the gradual recognition and extension of a derivative meaning, rather than to a lingering of a decadent primitive force, characteristic of a ruder period. The same phenomenon occurs in the use of νῦν δὲ-γάρ, ἀλλὰ-γάρ[1] and γάρ in responses.

[1] See p. 54 for table of authors.

Furthermore Baümlein does not offer a satisfactory explanation of the manner in which the causal force is developed from the primitive asseverative. There is no necessary kinship between a particle, which merely affirms a certainty, and one which symbolizes the causal connection between two facts. In the latter case, both the causal and the main statements may be equally hypothetical and uncertain, and yet, it may be asserted, that they bear the relation to one another of cause and result. The affirmative particle has no reference beyond the thought of its own clause, while the causal determines the relation of this thought to the preceding or following context. A sentence introduced by δέ, in Homer and Herodotus, often contains the cause of the foregoing statement though δέ is never other than an adversative, or lightly contrasting particle.

It is true that the German "ja" or English "indeed", or "certainly", may often translate γάρ without offending our logical sense. For these particles, since they indicate no sentence relation, may be inserted in any declarative sentence, whatever its connection be with the preceding thought. The English and German languages permit an asyndeton, where the Greek makes the relation of the sentences explicit. Translation, then, is not a reliable criterion of the force or function of a word in a foreign language.

The unfortunate ellipses which have been the objects of scorn and derision from the supporters of the asseverative theory, serve a purpose. They make explicit the logical links which are obscure or omitted, and are necessary mediums in explaining any thought relation. Whether they should be introduced into a literary translation is another question. A translator should aim at reproducing in his native language the thought of the original. When the idiom of his own tongue is at variance with the idiom undergoing translation the former must be substituted. It is not surprising, accordingly, that in many instances, where the Greeks use a symbol to denote the causal relation, but allow an ellipse in the main sentence, we must either omit the causal particles, or supply in full the ellipse.

An investigation, then, of the meanings of γάρ should be based, not on etymology and possibilities of translation, but on a careful analysis of the relation of the clause introduced by this particle, to the immediate context, and a comparison of the uses of the analogous causal particles.

We shall reserve Kalinka's theory for discussion in our treatment of the various uses where he believes the causal force has faded into the affirmative, making, however, this general criticism in advance, that it is always hazardous to assert to just what extent the hearer or speaker was conscious of the causal force in the more obscure cases. The Greek may not, in the somewhat stereotyped expressions, have analyzed carefully the syntax of the sentence. But the test of such formulae is to ascertain whether it was possible or not to revert to the more complete analogous phrases, in which the meaning of the particle is indisputable.

It is the purpose, then, of this paper to prove, that all of the meanings of γάρ are derivatives, more or less remote, of the reason-idea which it primarily conveyed, and that they may be assigned to the four following categories, (A) causal, (B) explicative, (C) motivating, (D) confirmatory.

The above meanings, though they are the bases of all the uses of the particle, have been subjected to various differentiations and modifications, due (1) to the character of the sentence, declarative, interrogative, or exclamatory, in which they occur, (2) to changes in the order of the γάρ clause in its relation to the main sentence, (3) to the tendency of the Greek language to suggest, but, not make explicit certain steps in the process of reasoning, (4) to the fact, that, word-groups, through frequency of use, are apt to become stereotyped.

With a view to showing how these factors have operated in varying, and, in some instances, obscuring, the original meaning of γάρ and, at the same time, aiming to test the conclusions of the scholars previously mentioned, I have divided the uses of γάρ into the following classes:—

(1) γάρ in declarative sentences referring to a definite antecedent which precedes, (2) anticipatory γάρ, (3) γάρ in questions, (4) in the groups ἀλλὰ-γάρ, (5) νῦν δὲ-γάρ, (6) καὶ γάρ, (7) γάρ in response, (8) γάρ in wishes, (9) γάρ in the compounds τοιγάρ, and τοιγαροῦν. Some of the classifications necessarily overlap.

In each of these classes again, there are distinguished, as far as the form of the subject-matter will admit, the four main divisions of the meanings of γάρ, namely, the causal, explicative, motivating and confirmatory.

CHAPTER II.

γάρ in declarative sentences.

I. Causal.

(1) The well-known use of *γάρ* in declarative sentences to convey the reason for the thought expressed in the preceding statement, may be dismissed with the citation of a few illustrations. Hom. Il. II 66. *θωρῆξαί σ' ἐκέλευσε κάρη κομόωντας Ἀχαιοὺς/πανσυδίῃ· νῦν γάρ κεν ἕλοις πόλιν εὐρυάγυιαν/Τρώων· οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' ἀμφὶς Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες/ἀθάνατοι φράζονται*[1]

An absolute distinction cannot be maintained, between the causal and explicative *γάρ*, since the cause of a fact is, in a sense, an explanation of it: e. g. Il. II 687 *ἀλλ' οἵ γ' οὐ πολέμοιο δυσηχέος ἐμνάοντο,/οὐ γὰρ ἔην ὅς τίς σφιν ἐπὶ στίχας ἡγήσαιτο·*

(2) After a command, the *γάρ* clause gives the reason, why the particular act referred to should, or should not, be performed: e. g. Od. XV. 335 *ἀλλὰ μέν'· οὐ γάρ τίς τοι ἀνιάεται παρεόντι*, Eur. Med. 926 *θάρσει νυν· εὖ γὰρ τῶνδε θήσομαι πέρι.*[2]

(3) A peculiar turn is often given the clause of reason, by referring it to a subordinate part of the preceding sentence, or, to one word: e. g. Od. XXI. 172. *νεμεσσῶμαι δέ τ' ἀκούων,/εἰ δὴ τοῦτό γε τόξον ἀριστῆας κεκαδήσει/θυμοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς, ἐπεὶ οὐ δύνασαι σὺ τανύσσαι./οὐ γάρ τοι σέ γε τοῖον ἐγείνατο πότνια μήτηρ,/οἷόν τε ῥυτῆρα βιοῦ τ' ἔμεναι . . .*[3] The *γάρ* clause must be construed with *οὐ δύνασαι σὺ*. The tone of the Greek might be conveyed by supplying *εἰκότως*, which does occur in a few instances. The clause of reason, here, serves, by chance, an ulterior purpose, in that it justifies an objection invalidating a conclusion drawn from a certain circumstance (*οὐ δύνασαι*) by a natural explanation of the fact.

An instance of a *γάρ* referring to a single word may be seen in Soph. O. C. 115. *σύ μ' ἐξ ὁδοῦ πόδα/κρύψον κατ' ἄλσος τῶνδ' ἕως ἂν*

[1] Il. I, 177, Od. X. 32 et passim, Thucyd. I. 18. 2, 47. 3, 49. 5, 57. 2, et al., Aesch. Prom. 716, Ag. 1532, Soph. Aj. 157, El. 244, 1305, Plat. Rep. 331. D.

[2] Cf. Soph. O. C. 252, 498, 501, 824, 1121, 1185, 1201, 1722, Aj. 69, El. 119, 1031, 1123, Aesch. Prom. 59, 128, 310, 718, Plat. Rep. 336 E, et al.

[3] Cf. Od. IV. 206, Thucyd. I, 20. 2, 141. 1, Prom. 149, Aj. 21, Ant. 270, 489, O. C. 79, Dem. De Cor. 204, (*εἰκότως*) 208, (*δικάιως*).

ἐκμάθω/τίνας λόγους ἐροῦσιν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ μαθεῖν/ ἔνεστιν ηὐλάβεια τῶν ποιουμένων.[1] . . .

(4) The cause of a fact, when it is not of sufficient importance to the progress of the narrative to be incorporated in it, is frequently added, as an aside, in a parenthesis: e. g. Herod. II. 149. 19. *τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ τὸ ἐν τῇ λίμνῃ αὐθιγενὲς μὲν οὐκ ἔστι (ἄνυδρος γὰρ δὴ δεινῶς ἐστι ἡ ταύτῃ)*[2]

II. Epexegetical or Explicative.

The *γάρ* clause explains, or develops the thought of either the whole sentence preceding, or, of a part of it. An explanation may assume two forms. It may (1) add some new fact, which is not a part of the main narrative, though essential to its clearness, or, (2) expand an incomplete, or general expression of a thought, by giving further details. In the latter case, it is a continuation of the principal theme, though subordinate in form. This use is closely allied to the confirmatory, which will be discussed on p. 22 since an expansion of a statement frequently affords proof of its truth.

(1) The explanatory sentences included in this category are logically parenthetical, though not always so written. They break the course of the thought, for a time, to render an obscure fact or expression more intelligible to the hearer.

The explanatory sentence may refer (a) to the main sentence as a whole: e. g. Od. V. 402. *καὶ δὴ δοῦπον ἄκουσε ποτὶ σπιλάδεσσι θαλάσσης·/ῥόχθεε γὰρ μέγα κῦμα ποτὶ ξερὸν ἠπείροιο/*[3] . . . (b) to a subordinate clause: e. g. Il. X. 352. *ἀλλ' ὅτε δή ῥ' ἀπέην ὅσσόν τ' ἐπὶ οὖρα πέλονται/ἡμιόνων—αἱ γάρ τε βοῶν προφερέστεραί εἰσιν/ἑλκέμεναι νειοῖο βαθείης πηκτὸν ἄροτρον . . . /τὼ μὲν ἐπιδραμέτην,*[4] . . . (c) to a word or phrase, very frequently a proper name: e. g. Herod. II. 12. 9. *οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ τῇ Συρίῃ (τῆς γὰρ Ἀραβίης τὰ παρὰ θάλασσαν Σύροι νέμονται), . . .*[5]

(2) The second division, explanation by expansion, is of especial interest by reason of the number of variations, and extensions of use, that it presents. Its close connection with confirmatory *γάρ*, which will be discussed later as a separate category, has already been noted. Along another line of develop-

[1] Cf. Aj. 1069, and Jebb's note; Aesch. Ag. 1368. See motivating *γάρ* p. 18.

[2] Cf. Brosch. p. 14 for other instances in Herod.

[3] Cf. Il. I. 270, II. 597, VI. 300, XXIII. 774, Od. XVI. 161, Herod. I. 151. 4, et freq. Broschman, p. 14, for list of instances, Thucy. I. 126. 6, Soph. O. R. 1504.

[4] Cf. Il. XVII. 612, Od. III. 221, IV. 368, Herod. II. 68. 23, 121b. 6, et al.

[5] Cf. Od. XII. 354, XVII. 172, Il. I. 63, Herod. I. 77. 6, II. 99. 21.

ment, the expansion of a single word, it is one of the chief sources of the γάρ used in introducing a narrative or an argument.

Before, however, we enter upon an investigation of the different steps, in the transition to these uses, a few instances of the simpler epexegetic clauses will be cited. The same distinction must be made, here, as in the other divisions, between γάρ referring to, (a) a whole sentence, (b) a subordinate thought, and (c) a word.

(a) Od. XIV. 317. *ἔνθα με Θεσπρωτῶν βασιλεὺς ἐκομίσσατο Φείδων/ ἥρως ἀπριάτην· τοῦ γὰρ φίλος υἱὸς ἐπελθών/ αἴθρῳ καὶ καμάτῳ δεδμημένον ἦγεν ἐς οἶκον*[1] . . . .

(b) Aesch. Ag. 1583. *χερὸς πατρῴας ἐκτίνοντα μηχανάς./ Ἀτρεὺς γὰρ ἄρχων τῆσδε γῆς, τούτου πατὴρ,/ πατέρα Θυέστην τὸν ἐμὸν, . . . / ἠνδρηλάτησεν ἐκ πόλεως . . .*[2]

(c) Soph. O. C. 1615. *ἀλλ' ἓν γὰρ μόνον/ τὰ πάντα λύει ταῦτ' ἔπος μοχθήματα./ τὸ γὰρ φιλεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ ὅτου πλέον*[3] . . .

In the latter class must be included the γάρ clauses expanding forward-pointing demonstrative pronouns, and adverbs:[4] e. g. Il. VIII. 148. *ἀλλὰ τόδ' αἰνὸν ἄχος κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ἱκάνει·/ Ἕκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων·*[5]

Stein and Sernatinger insist on another explanation of the like instances in Herodotus. The explanatory clause introduced by γάρ, they maintain, never refers to the demonstrative pronoun, but looks forward, and prepares the way, for the real explanation which follows, by elucidating some obscure point mentioned in it: e. g. Herod. I. 134, *ἐντυγχάνοντες δ' ἀλλήλοισι ἐν τῇσι ὁδοῖσι, τῷδε ἄν τις διαγνοίη εἰ ὅμοιοί εἰσι οἱ συντυγχανόντες· ἀντὶ γὰρ τοῦ προσαγορεύειν ἀλλήλους φιλέουσι τοῖσι στόμασι, ἢν δὲ ᾖ οὗτερος ὑποδεέστερος ὀλίγῳ, τὰς παρειὰς φιλέονται, ἢν δὲ . . . .* The explanation to which τῷδε points, begins, according to these scholars, with *ἢν δὲ*. This view is rightly criticized by Broschman[6] who points out, that if we make γάρ point forward, there is no explanation of the kind of salutation used, when the social status of the persons is such as is de-

[1] Cf. Il. I. 12, II. 386. IV. 518, V. 188, Od. I. 33, III. 89, Aesch. Ag. 326, 559, 654, 916, 1630, Soph. O. R. 317, Aj. 723, 764.

[2] Cf. Prom. 29, 862, 1016, Ag. 14.

[3] Cf. Aesch. Pers. 337, Soph. El. 1320, O. R. 476.

[4] This is substantially the explanation of γάρ given by Devar. p. 236, Matth. p. 467, Hart. I. p. 468, Kl. p. 235, Kueh. § 544 A, Baüm. p. 83.

[5] Cf. Il. XVI. 239, Od. IX. 319, XX. 42, XXI. 74, 232, XXIII. 362, after ὧδε Il. II. 803, XXIV. 662 *τοιάδε* Soph. O. R. 779, *τοιοῦτον* Plat. Prot. 328 B, *ἐνθέν δε* Apol. 31 B, *ἐκεῖθεν* Isoc. III. 31.

[6] Cf. p. 22. A collection of instances in Herod. is also given here.

scribed in the condition εἰ ὅμοιοί εἰσι οἱ συντυγχανόντες, for ἦν δὲ .... continues the description begun in the ἐντυγχάνοντες δέ clause by introducing a new set of circumstances.

Forman, an adherent of Baümlein's School (Plato Selections App. 5. 3.) defines γάρ epexegetic, as a survival of the original certifying γάρ. He includes, however, it would seem from the illustrations used, only those instances, where the γάρ introduces an expansion of a demonstrative phrase, or, follows ἄκουε δή, or a similar expression calling attention to the information, contained in the γάρ clause. He believes that it is an appositive sentence, equivalent to the object clause which is frequently found after these phrases: e. g. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον ὅτι ...

Mr. Forman has fallen into error, by failing to note the connection between these highly developed uses of explanatory γάρ and the simpler forms, where the "for" meaning of the particle is undeniable: e. g. Aesch. Ag. 1630. Ὀρφεῖ δὲ γλῶσσαν τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔχεις/. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἦγε πάντ' ἀπὸ φθογγῆς χαρᾷ,/ σὺ δ' ἐξορίνας νηπίοις ὑλαγμασιν/ἄξει· ... Now, here, the γάρ clause might be considered appositive to ἐναντίαν, yet, if it were omitted, there would be an asyndeton, an allowable one, it is true, but, still, apparent, since apposition indicates similarity of thought, but, not thought relation. The latter is expressed, in the example quoted above by the γάρ.

Why should a different interpretation be applied where this particle performs a similar function after τόδε or τοιάδε? It is true, ἐναντίαν conveys a more definite idea, and does not, like τοιάδε, force us to suspend our judgment, until we reach the expanding clause, which, for this reason, is so closely connected, that the causal particle is often omitted. But the γάρ clause is, in each case, a development of a thought, of which, only a bare suggestion has been given.

When some descriptive phrase is added to the colorless demonstrative, the causal force of the particle is more easily discerned: e. g. Soph. O. R. 779. τοιάδ' ἐπέστη, θαυμάσαι μὲν ἀξία,/ σπουδῆς γε μέντοι τῆς ἐμῆς οὐκ ἀξία./ἀνὴρ γὰρ ἐν δείπνοις μ' ὑπερπλησθεὶς μέθῃ/καλεῖ παρ' οἶνῳ, πλαστὸς ὡς εἴην πατρί.

From the expansion of a demonstrative combined with a word meaning argument, instance, and the like, the explanatory usage was extended to the elliptical phrases without the demonstrative: e. g. τεκμήριον δέ, σημεῖον δέ, κεφάλαιον δέ, ὁ δὲ δεινότατον, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, σχετλιώτατον.[1] A transitional example may be seen in Thucyd.

[1] Cf. Thucy. I. 2. 6, 3. 1, 3. 8, 11. 1, 34. 2, 73. 5, 93. 1, O. R. 711.

I. 2. 6. καὶ παράδειγμα τόδε τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐλάχιστόν ἐστι διὰ τὰς μετοικήσεις τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ὁμοίως αὐξηθῆναι·/ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος . . .[1]

γάρ introducing a narrative has a similar origin to that of the above. It was first used to expand, and explain, some general phrase, announcing the speech to follow: e. g. Od. XI. 508. πᾶσαν ἀληθείην μυθήσομαι, ὥς με κελεύεις·/αὐτὸς γάρ μιν ἐγὼ κοίλης ἐπὶ νηὸς ἐίσης/ἤγαγον ἐκ . . . XII. 59. ἐρέω δέ τοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν./ ἔνθεν μὲν γὰρ πέτραι . . . Soph. El. 681. κἀπεμπόμην πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ τὸ πᾶν φράσω./ κεῖνος γὰρ ἐλθὼν εἰς τὸ κλεινὸν Ἑλλάδος. . . .[2] Frequent occurrence of such colorless phrases as are cited here, made it possible for a speech or an argument to be introduced by narrative γάρ, where only a bare declaration of intention to speak, or a phrase arresting the hearer's attention, had preceded.

It is impossible to say how far the Greeks were conscious in each case of the explanatory force of γάρ, which at last may have become a stereotyped formula for the opening of a speech. The constant reversion, however, to the fuller phraseology is proof that the original function of the particle in this construction was not wholly obscured.

The developed use in narrative is exemplified by such instances as Thucyd. I. 73. 4. ῥηθήσεται δὲ οὐ παραιτήσεως μᾶλλον ἕνεκα ἢ μαρτυρίου καὶ δηλώσεως πρὸς οἵαν ὑμῖν πόλιν μὴ εὖ βουλευομένοις ὁ ἀγὼν καταστήσεται. φαμὲν γὰρ Μαραθῶνί τε μόνοι προκινδυνεῦσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ[3] . . . Plat. Rep. 329 A. Ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, νὴ τὸν Δία ἐρῶ, ὦ Σώκ., οἷόν γέ μοι φαίνεται. πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθά τινες εἰς ταὐτὸ . . . .[4]

Plato and the orators frequently employ γάρ in a like narrative sense to introduce arguments: e. g. Plat. Prot. 323 C. ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύσει ἡγοῦνται εἶναι . . . . τοῦτό σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἡγοῦνται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἄνθρωποι φύσει ἢ τύχῃ,[5] . . .

III. Motivating.

[1] Cf. Sernatinger I. p. 45 fg. for discussion of various interpretations. The τόδε must be referred, as Sern. says, to the clause following.

[2] Cf. Soph. El. 32, 379, 644, 681, 690, 893, Ant. 238, Aj. 216, 285, 749, Phil. 915, 1326, 1337, O. R. 277, 346, 1241, O. C. 909, Aesch. Prom. 107, 645, 829, 903, Ag. 1186.

[3] Cf. Thucyd. I. 2. 1, 141. 3, O. R. 994, O. C. 547.

[4] Cf. Plat. Apol. 24. B. C, Apol. 32. A. B. Prot. 319. A (ἐγὼ γάρ), 320 C, 342 A, Apol. 39 C, Rep. 338 C.

[5] Cf. Apol. 32 D, 39 E, 40 B, Prot. 349 D. Note γάρ referring to τῇδε in argument, Apol. 40 C.

The motivating γάρ clause, as distinguished from the above categories, does not give the reason for, nor, explain the thought contained in a previous statement, question, or command, but justifies the utterance of these sentences; it interrupts the objective discourse, and gives in parenthesis, as it were, the inner motive for the words just spoken. By this medium the subconscious processes of reasoning, which have found only partial expression in speech, are revealed.

In the sphere of the emotions, it is a convenient device for conveying that nice logical distinction, always maintained by the Greeks, between the feeling and the circumstance, which had caused the feeling. The γάρ clause may be preceded by a manifestation of the emotion through an exclamation, or other means, or may itself be the first indication of the emotion. It is most frequent in the dramatists and writers of prose dialogue, the continuous play of feeling, present in all lively dramatic discourse, finding in this form its happiest expression. The exact reference of the particle is not always easily discerned, since the speaker may, under stress of feeling, pass over the intermediate stages of reasoning, to a thought or emotion, remotely and vaguely connected with the preceding utterance.

A like subjective use is made of the other causal conjunctions, as Goodwin (M & T 719. 2) and Forman (Plato Select. App. to 105. 10) have noted. It is especially characteristic of ἐπεί, which in all those instances, where we are tempted to translate it as "although", may, almost invariably, be explained, as motivating the making of the statement, or some part of the statement.

Motivating γάρ and ἐπεί clauses tend to approach, in extreme cases, the explanatory and confirmatory meanings. They may often do double service, motivating, for example, the use of a certain word, by explaining its meaning and pointing out its peculiar aptness. The predominant force of the particle is in that case, determined by the context, or, the point of view of the interpreter. This fusion of meanings will be better understood, after examining the cases of pure motivation under the several divisions following.

(1) At the close of a speech, an explanation of the circumstances which occasioned it, is frequently appended: e. g. Soph. Trach. 285. ταῦτα γὰρ πόσις τε σὸς/ἐφεῖτ', ἐγὼ δὲ πιστὸς ὢν κείνῳ τελῶ.

Likewise, after a statement, the reason for mentioning the fact therein contained may be given: e. g. Plat. Rep. 328 A. καὶ πρός γε

παννυχίδα ποιήσουσιν, ἣν ἄξιον θεάσασθαι· ἐξαναστησόμεθα γὰρ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ τὴν παννυχίδα θεασόμεθα. . . .[1]

The use of this *γάρ*, to justify an advance in the argument, is a characteristic trait of the style of Plato, e. g. Theae. 155 C. *καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα παραδεξόμεθα. ἔπει γάρ που, ὦ Θεαί·*[2]

(2) In analyzing the *γάρ* clause after a command, the reason why the person issues the command, or, addresses it to a particular person, must be distinguished from the reason for the performance of the specific act mentioned. The latter is concerned, wholly, with the thought-content, and has no personal element. In the other instance, the act is viewed with reference, either to the person commanding, or, commanded. The examples following will make clear this distinction. Il. I. 78. *σὺ δὲ σύνθεο καί μοι ὄμοσσον/ἦ μήν μοι πρόφρων ἔπεσιν καὶ χερσὶν ἀρήξειν./ἦ γὰρ οἴομαι ἄνδρα χολωσέμεν ὃς μέγα πάντων . . . .*[3]

Soph. El. 42. *σὺ μὲν μολών, ὅταν σε καιρὸς εἰσάγῃ,/δόμων ἔσω τῶνδ', ἴσθι πᾶν τὸ δρώμενον, . . . οὐ γάρ σε μὴ γήρᾳ τε καὶ χρόνῳ μακρῷ/γνῶσ',*[4] Baümlein p. 84, despite of his aversion to ellipse, would supply here, "du kannst ohne Gefahr hineingehen denn . . . ." But the sentence supplied does not express fully the logical connection of the *γάρ* clause with the command. To put every step into precise words, we should have to say, "I address the command to you, for . . .". It would then be unnecessary to add the sentence supplied by Baümlein, since the assurance, that there is no danger, is virtually the thought, which Orestes wishes to convey in the causal clause.

The connection may be, occasionally, somewhat obscure, as when a *γάρ* clause for example, Soph. O. R. 576 contains the reason for a command, indicating acquiescence in the demand of another. ΚΡ. *εἰ μὲν λέγει τάδ', αὐτὸς οἶσθ'· ἐγὼ δέ σου/μαθεῖν δικαιῶ ταὔθ', ἅπερ κἀμοῦ σὺ νῦν./ΟΙ. ἐκμάνθαν'· οὐ γὰρ δὴ φονεὺς ἁλώσομαι.*[5] Oedipus in a tone of defiant assurance consents to have Creon learn the

[1] Cf. Od. IV. 200 Soph. O. R. 569, 1397, Tr. 289, 479, El. 466, 957, Eur. Med. 1370, Ar. Plut. 76, Plat. Rep. 367 B, 345 C, Prot. 319 A.

[2] Cf. Euthyd. 295 C, Phaedo 60 A.

[3] Cf. Od. VIII. 552, Aes. Prom. 345, Soph. O. R. 862, Eur. Med. 625, 663, 1076, 1360. Cf. *ἐπεί* Dem. XL. 54.

[4] Cf. Il. X. 176, IX. 422, XX. 312, O. C. 508, Eur. Med. 821. Cf. *ἐπειδή* Med. 603.

[5] Cf. Aj. 1330. Aesch. Prom. 940. 995.

whole truth, because he rejects the alternative of that, which he alleges is the truth, namely his innocence of the murder of Laius. There is a number of instances, however, where the motive for the command is also the reason why the act should be performed: e. g. Eur. Med. 618. *οὔτ' ἄν ξένοισι τοῖσι σοῖς χρησαίμεθ' ἄν, / οὔτ' ἄν τι δεξαίμεσθα, μήθ' ἡμῖν δίδου· / κακοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς δῶρ' ὄνησιν οὐκ ἔχει.*[1]

(3) A question may be motivated by relating the circumstances, which necessitated the asking of it. This use must not be confounded with the *γάρ*, introducing a confirmation, after a rhetorical question equivalent to a negative statement: e. g. Aesch. Ag. 1133. *ἀπὸ δὲ θεσφάτων τίς ἀγαθὰ φάτις / βροτοῖς τέλλεται; κακῶν γὰρ διαὶ / πολυεπεῖς τέχναι θεσπιῳδὸν / φόβον φέρουσιν μαθεῖν.* Here the *γάρ* clause does not reveal the questioner's motive, but establishes the truth implied in the question. The distinction will be apparent, if we compare the following instances of the motivating use: Soph. O. R. 559. *δέδρακε ποῖον ἔργον; οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.* Il. VI. 124. *τίς δὲ σὺ ἐσσὶ, φέριστε, καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων; / οὐ μὲν γάρ ποτ' ὄπωπα μάχῃ ἐνὶ κυδιανείρῃ / τὸ πρίν*·[2]

Another class of *γάρ* clauses confirming questions, is less easy to distinguish from the above, namely, when the asking of the question is justified by a verification of the correctness of the sentiment therein expressed, or of the aptness of some word: e. g. Soph. O. R. 357. *πρὸς τοῦ διδαχθείς; οὐ γὰρ ἔκ γε τῆς τέχνης.*[3]

Again, in Soph. Phil. 624 the *γάρ* while motivating the scorn, and incredulity suggested in the question, also confirms the implied negative statement. *ἦ κεῖνος, ἡ πᾶσα βλάβη, / ἔμ' εἰς Ἀχαιοὺς ὤμοσεν πείσας στελεῖν; / πεισθήσομαι γὰρ ὧδε κἀξ Ἄιδου θανὼν / πρὸς φῶς ἀνελθεῖν, ὥσπερ οὑκείνου πατήρ.*[4]

(4) Instances of *γάρ* justifying the utterance of a wish, are more rare than the above, but no less clearly defined in character: e. g. Soph. Aj. 1265. *εἴθ' ὑμὶν ἀμφοῖν νοῦς γένοιτο σωφρονεῖν· τούτου γὰρ οὐδὲν σφῷν ἔχω λῷον φράσαι.*[5]

An interesting parallel *ἐπεί* occurs Soph. O. C. 1125: *καί σοι θεοὶ πόροιεν ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω, / αὐτῷ τε καὶ γῇ τῇδ'· ἐπεὶ τό γ' εὐσεβὲς / μόνοις παρ' ὑμῖν ηὗρον ἀνθρώπων ἐγὼ . . . .*

[1] Cf. Soph. O. C. 560 Arist. Eccles. 164.

[2] Aesch. Ag. 1110, Soph. O. R. 89, 120, 571, O. C. 115, El. 813, 1175, Phil. 1358, Eur. Med. 1376, Plat. Rep. 376 A, Laws 629 D. Cf. *ἐπεί* Il. XIII. 309.

[3] Cf. Soph. O. R. 1420, O. C. 359, Aj. 183, 1322; Eur. Ion. 326. Cf. *ἐπεί* Od. I. 226.

[4] Cf. Il. XI. 408, (Baüm. construes as affirmative *γάρ*), Dem. XIX. 335 p. 449, (rebuke) IX. 16, p. 114.

[5] Cf. Aesch. Ag. 350, 948.

(5) When justifying an emotion, the more animated question, or wish form, is usually preferred to the declarative sentence. The feeling motivated by the declarative sentence, is, as far as I have been able to observe, always expressed by some epithet, or exclamation: e. g. Soph. O. R. 1071, where it follows a wail of woe. *ἰοὺ ἰού, δύστηνε. τοῦτο γάρ σ' ἔχω/μόνον προσειπεῖν, ἄλλο δ' οὔποθ' ὕστερον./*[1] In Soph. O. R. 334, the *γάρ* may be said to justify the anger calling forth the epithet, or, the epithet alone: *οὐκ, ὦ κακῶν κάκιστε, καὶ γὰρ ἂν πέτρου/ φύσιν σύ γ' ὀργάνειας, ἐξερεῖς ποτε,/ . . .* A clear instance of the latter may be seen Eur. Med. 465: *ὦ παγκάκιστε, τοῦτο γάρ σ' εἰπεῖν ἔχω/γλώσσῃ μέγιστον εἰς ἀνανδρίαν κακόν, . . .*

(6) Justification of the utterance of a word, or, of a subordinate part of the main sentence, is the most common form of the motivating use: e. g. Soph. El. 577 (a condition is motivated). *εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐρῶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ σόν, κεῖνον θέλων/ ἐπωφελῆσαι ταῦτ' ἔδρα*[2] *. . .* Aesch. Ag. 1226, (a single word). *ἐκ τῶνδε ποινάς φημι βουλεύειν τινὰ/λέοντ' ἄναλκιν . . . μολόντι δεσπότῃ/ἐμῷ· φέρειν γὰρ χρὴ τὸ δούλιον ζυγόν.*[3]

With the first instance, an analogous use of *ἐπεί* may be compared: Dem. XV. 13. *οἶμαι μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ βοηθήσειν αὐτήν, ἂν δ' ἄρα τοῦτο ποιῇ, φαύλως καὶ κακῶς· ἐπεὶ καὶ βασιλέα γε, ὅ τι μὲν ποιήσει μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμ' ἔγωγ' ὡς οἶδα,*[4] *. . .* Prot. 336 D illustrates *ἐπεί* motivating a word: *ἕως ἄν ἐπιλάθωνται περὶ ὅτου τὸ ἐρώτημα ἦν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκουόντων· ἐπεὶ Σωκράτη γ' ἐγὼ ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι . . .*.[5]

It is difficult, in a number of examples, to separate, absolutely, the motivating and confirming uses of both *γάρ* and *ἐπεί*, since the application of a word is justified by proving, that it is true to fact, or, that the alternative of it is impossible. In the latter case, attention is invariably called to the contrasted word, by placing the particle *γε* after it: e. g. Il. III. 453. *ἀλλ' οὔ τις δύνατο Τρώων κλεϊτῶν τ' ἐπικούρων/ δεῖξαι Ἀλέξανδρον τότ' ἀρηιφίλῳ Μενελάῳ./οὐ μὲν γὰρ φιλότητί γ' ἐκεύθανον, εἴ τις ἴδοιτο·*[6] Plat. Rep. 382 B. *Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀρθότατά γ' ἄν, ὅ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος καλοῖτο, ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοια ἡ τοῦ ἐψευσμένου· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τ' τοῦ ἐν τῇ*

[1] Aesch. Ag. 1137, Soph. O. R. 167, 317, El. 788.

[2] Cf. Od. XV. 433, Soph. Aj. 23, Ant. 328, 489, 722, Plat. Phil. 30 E.

[3] Il. I. 295, II. 119, Soph. Ant. 32, Aj. 1069, O. R. 105.

[4] Cf. Od. I. 226, Plat. Prot. 335 C, 338 C, Sym. 182 A, 187 A, Parm. 126 E, Dem. LXI. 49, Epist. III. 15.

[5] Plat. Theae. 142 C, Gorg. 471 E, Prot. 333 C, Laws 769 B, 818 B, Dem. XVIII. 101, Epist. II. 18.

[6] Cf. Od. XI. 450, Soph. O. R. 87.

ψυχῇ ἐστὶ παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἴδωλον, οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος.[1] In like manner a γάρ clause, Il. I. 342, admits of the two interpretations: τὼ δ' αὐτὼ μάρτυροι ἔστων/ . . . εἴ ποτε δ' αὖτε/χρειὼ ἐμεῖο γένηται ἀεικέα λοιγὸν ἀμῦναι/τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἦ γὰρ ὅ γ' ὀλοιῇσι φρεσὶ θύει,/οὐδέ τι οἶδε νοῆσαι ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω,/ὅπως οἱ παρὰ νηυσὶ σάοι μαχέονται Ἀχαιοί.

Baümlein, p. 69 cites this passage, as an instance of the affirmative meaning. The causal connection, however, it seems to me, can not be disputed. Achilles, by means of the γάρ clause establishes the likelihood of the prediction contained in the condition, and thereby shows, that he has just ground for calling attention to it explicitly. If a merely asseverative force were given to γάρ, the sequence of thought would be obscure. The particle ἦ has sufficient asseverative meaning for the sentence. What is needed, is, rather, a word to indicate the subtle logical connection.

IV. Confirmatory.

The distinguishing characteristic of confirmatory γάρ is, that it verifies the truth of an assertion, or, the correctness of use of a word, or phrase. At times, it approaches the simple causal[2] and explanatory[3] uses, in that an explanation, or proof, may be employed to substantiate a statement, and again, it is often merged in the motivating γάρ, as was shown in the preceding pages.[4]

Apart, however, from these indeterminate blended uses, there exists a number of instances, in which the function of the particle is distinctively confirmatory. Though methods of proof are countless, a few of the typical forms will be briefly outlined.

(1) The γάρ clause points out that the supposition of conditions opposite to those in the main clause, necessitates a conclusion which is contrary to well-known existing facts. As a natural result the confirmatory sentence is, in every case, conditional, and the premise, that must usually be supplied, is the opposite of the preceding statement. ἦ γάρ (for else), or οὐ γάρ are the common, introductory formulae: e. g. Il. II. 242. ἀλλὰ μάλ' οὐκ Ἀχιλῆι χόλος φρεσίν, ἀλλὰ μεθήμων·/ ἦ γὰρ ἄν, Ἀτρεΐδη, νῦν ὕστατα λωβήσαιο. Soph. O. R. 318. ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς ἐγὼ/εἰδὼς διῴλεσ'· οὐ γὰρ ἄν δεῦρ' ἱκόμην.[5]

[1] Cf. O. C. 966, Eur. Hel. 97. Plat. Rep. 352 C.

[2] Cf. p. 13. [3] Cf. p. 14. [4] Cf. p. 18.

[5] Cf. Herod. I. 124, II. 49. 13, 134. 6, III. 38. 1, et al. Soph. O. C. 125, O. R. 318, El. 1448, Phil. 947.

Sometimes, as in Dem. XVIII. § 228, the condition is expressed in the form of a genitive absolute. *ὡμολόγηκεν ἡμᾶς ὑπάρχειν ἐγνωσμένους, ἐμὲ μὲν λέγειν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος, αὐτὸν δ' ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μεταπείθειν ὑμᾶς ἐζήτει, μὴ τοιαύτης οὔσης τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ὑπολήψεως περὶ ἑκατέρου.*

A similar proof may be introduced by *ἐπεί*: e. g. Xen. Cyr. II. 2. 31. *Μὰ Δία ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ φιλόπονός ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ ἤρκει ἄν αὐτῷ, εἰ ἐμέ ἤθελε φιλεῖν τοῦτο ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν γυμνασίων.*

(2) A particular instance is often cited, to substantiate a general truth, or, a maxim, in confirmation of a specific case: e. g. Soph. Trach. 62. *ὦ τέκνον, ὦ παῖ, κἀξ ἀγεννήτων ἄρα/μῦθοι καλῶς πίπτουσιν. ἥδε γὰρ γυνὴ/δούλη μέν, εἴρηκεν δ' ἐλεύθερον λόγον.*[1] Ant. 295 *ἐκ τῶνδε τούτους ἐξεπίσταμαι καλῶς/παρηγμένους μισθοῖσιν εἰργάσθαι τάδε./οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώποισιν οἷον ἄργυρος/κακὸν νόμισμ' ἔβλαστε.*[2]

(3) Another way of verifying the truth of an assertion, is, to relate the circumstances which enable the speaker to have an accurate knowledge of the matter: e. g. Il. III. 205. *ὦ γύναι, ἦ μάλα τοῦτο ἔπος νημερτὲς ἔειπες· / ἤδη γὰρ καὶ δεῦρό ποτ' ἦλυθε δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς/σεῖ' ἕνεκ' ἀγγελίην.*[3] . . .

(4) The rejection of the alternative of that which is maintained as true is another well-known form: e. g. Med. 325. *λόγους ἀναλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ οὖν πείσεις ποτέ.*,[4] as is also the challenging of the hearer to test, or refute the assertion: e. g. Aesch. Prom. 294. *γνώσει δὲ τάδ' ὡς ἔτυμ', οὐδὲ μάτην/χαριτογλωσσεῖν ἔνι νοι· φέρε γὰρ/σήμαιν' ὅτι χρή σοι συμπράσσειν·*[5] *γε* or *οὖν* is frequently combined with the *γάρ* or *ἐπεί* of the first named use: e. g. Plat. Gorg. 471 E. *οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω.*[6]

Fusion of causal and confirmatory meanings, to which reference was made at the beginning of this chapter, may be seen most clearly in those instances, where a prediction is justified: e. g. Il. XXIV. 729. *πρὶν γὰρ πόλις ἥδε κατ' ἄκρης/πέρσεται· ἦ γὰρ ὄλωλας ἐπίσκοπος, ὅς τέ μιν αὐτὸς/ῥύσκε',* . . .[7]

More common, however, is the intermingling of the explanatory with this meaning; for the expansion of a statement, by giving further details, may establish also its reasonableness, and truth:

[1] Cf. Soph. O. R. 590, Ant. 184, Aj. 650, El. 698. [2] Cf. id. 661, 703.

[3] Cf. Od. II. 170, Plat. Prot. 312 A, and Brosch. p. 19, who discusses the instances in Herod. under the general topic of ellipse.

[4] Cf. frequent use of *ἐπεὶ* O. C. 969, El. 352, O. R. 390.

[5] Cf. Soph. Elect. 585, and *ἐπεί* id. 352, O. R. 390, Eur. Hec. 1208.

[6] Cf. Rep. 601 B. [7] Cf. Soph. O. R. 1227, O. C. 1372.

e. g. Od. VII. 201. *εἰ δέ τις ἀθανάτων . . . εἰλήλουθεν,/ ἄλλο τι δὴ τόδ' ἔπειτα θεοὶ περιμηχανάονται./ αἰεὶ γὰρ τὸ πάρος γε θεοὶ φαίνονται ἐναργεῖς ἡμῖν, . . .*[1]

γάρ must sometimes be referred to a part, only, of the sentence: e. g. Soph. El. 525 *λέγω κακῶς κλύουσα πρὸς σέθεν θαμά./ πατὴρ γάρ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο σοὶ πρόσχημ' ἀεί, ὡς ἐξ ἐμοῦ τέθνηκεν.* The statement contained in the participial phrase, *κακῶς . . . θαμὰ* is verified. In Aesch. Ag. 422 reference is to a single word, (*ματαίαν*): *πάρεισι δόξαι φέρουσαι χάριν ματαίαν./ μάταν γάρ, εὖτ' ἄν ἐσθλά τις δοκῶν ὁρᾷ,*/as also, Soph. O. C. 110 *οἰκτίρατ' ἀνδρὸς Οἰδίπου τόδ' ἄθλιον/ εἴδωλον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τόδ' ἀρχαῖον δέμας.* The blending of motivating and confirmatory forces is well illustrated in the last example. The *γάρ* clause contains, at the same time, the reason for the use of *εἴδωλον* and a confirmation of the correctness of its application. The same fusion occurs in the use of *ἐπεί* referring to a single word: e. g. Plat. Prot. 317 A. *οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττειν, ὥνπερ ἕνεκα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ προσχήματα· ἐπεὶ οἵ γε πολλοὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, ἀλλ' ἅττ' ἄν οὗτοι διαγγέλωσι, ταῦτα ὑμνοῦσι.*[2]

The exact reference of the *γάρ* clause is sometimes obscure, owing to the fact, that, between this clause and the one to which it refers, there intervenes another independent sentence. Failure to trace this connection has, in not a few instances, led interpreters to deny the causal force of the particle.

Since this loose sentence juncture is found in all of the uses of *γάρ* mentioned above, the citations following are given under these several classes.

(1) Causal, Od. XX. 273. *καὶ χαλεπόν περ ἐόντα δεχώμεθα μῦθον, Ἀχαιοί,/ Τηλεμάχου· μάλα δ' ἡμιν ἀπειλήσας ἀγορεύει./ οὐ γὰρ Ζεὺς εἴασε Κρονίων· τῷ κέ μιν ἤδη/ παύσαμεν ἐν μεγάροισι . . . .*[3]

Baümlein is clearly mistaken in his analysis. He translates thus "Zeus liess es ja nicht geschehen; sonst hätten wir ihn längst zur Ruhe gebracht," and classifies it with the use of *γάρ* in an independent sentence preceding the conclusion which is drawn from it. Such sentences, he maintains, are not grammatically connected with the previous context. This is impossible,

[1] Cf. Soph. O. C. 339, 555, 1613, Ant. 141, 178, 615, 962, 1168, Trach. 9, 132, El. 305, Aj. 9.

[2] The *ἐπεὶ* clause motivates *τοὺς δυναμένους*, and confirms *ὥνπερ ἕνεκα ἐστὶν.* Cf. Xen. Oec. XIX. 7.

[3] Cf. Her. I, 71. 20, III. 89, et al. Cf. Brosch. p. 17, who notes this as a trait of Her. style.

for the sentence introduced by γάρ is not the main sentence, but a confirmation of the statement, to which it is added, and, as Sernatinger (I p. 35) suggests, must be connected with χαλεπόν περ ἐόντα . . . δεχώμεθα.

(2) Explanatory: e. g. Aesch. Ag. 555. τὰ δ' αὖτε κἀπίμομφα. τίς δὲ πλὴν θεῶν / ἅπαντ' ἀπήμων τὸν δι' αἰῶνος χρόνον; μόχθους γὰρ εἰ λέγοιμι καὶ δυσαυλίας, σπαρνὰς . . .[1]

(3) Confirmatory and explanatory: e. g. Od. XX. 306. Κτήσιππ', ἦ μάλα τοι τόδε κέρδιον ἔπλετο θυμῷ· / οὐκ ἔβαλες τὸν ξεῖνον· ἀλεύατο γὰρ βέλος αὐτός. ἦ γάρ κέν σε μέσον βάλον ἔγχει . . . .

(4) Motivating: e. g. Il. 11. 119 καί με κελεύει / δυσκλέε' Ἄργος ἰκέσθαι, ἐπεὶ πολὺν ὤλεσα λαόν. / οὕτω που Διὶ μέλλει ὑπερμενέι, φίλον εἶναι, / ὅς . . . . αἰσχρὸν γὰρ τόδε γ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πυθέσθαι, / μὰψ οὕτω τοιόνδε τοσόνδε τε λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν / ἄπρηκτον πόλεμον πολεμιζέμεν . . .[2]

[1] Cf. Od. XIV. 228, Soph. Aj. 25.

[2] A number of obscure instances found in Anthol. Lyr. have been omitted in this summary, because it is probable that a lost context gave them their meaning: e. g. Tyrtaeus 8. 1. (Bergk) Theog. 423, 441. Archil. 60, Theog. 287; compare Euenus 8. with Theognis 472. The latter explains the former.

CHAPTER III.

Anticipatory γάρ.

A speaker may reverse the usual order of the clause of reasoning and the main sentence for rhetorical effect, or for the sake of clearness, and, anticipating the command or statement which he is about to make, conciliate and prepare in advance the mind of the hearers for a favorable acceptance, and better understanding of his words.

The difference between this use and the regularly-arranged, causal and motivating γάρ clauses, is purely rhetorical. Logically, the thought of the main sentence must be conceived in the mind of the speaker, before he can give the reason, or motivate, or explain it, but he seeks to have the two parts strike the ear of the listener in a different relation.

The possibility, however, of a forward-pointing γάρ, has been, in the case of Homer, disputed at some length by Doederlein, in his dissertation, entitled "Homerica particula γάρ nusquam refertur ad insequentem sententiam." He maintains that γάρ "quoties credatur ad sequentia verba spectare, reddere gestus potius alicuius nutusve rationem qui aliquo animi motu expressus orationem loquentis praecesserat aut comitetur", and supports his view by drawing attention to the fact that the proleptic γάρ (so-called) is found only in speeches.

As we have stated before, the difference between the two uses is rhetorical and not logical, and Doederlein's suggestion does not remove the objection, that the order of the thoughts, or feelings, to which utterance is given, is still at variance with common usage. It makes little difference whether we say that a person had the command, or statement in mind, before the γάρ clause, or that he expressed it by some gesture, so long as there is no articulate expression of it, to which γάρ could be referred.

No confusion in understanding the relation of the causal clause can result, since it invariably either follows directly after the vocative, or is inserted after some other opening words of the main sentence.

Classen (Beobachtungen über den homerischen Sprachgebrauch, Frankfurt am Main, 1854) was the first to draw attention to, and rightly explain, the force of proleptic γάρ, as he named it. He remarks on the greater frequency of parataxis in Homer than in classical authors, and the consequent tendency to denote subordination by parenthesis rather than by relative conjunctions. Homer, he believes, shows in this an earlier stage of linguistic development, for he allows the parts of the sentence to follow in their genetic order, where the grammatical formation of the period, which has in view the relation of the single parts to one another, would demand a more artificial order.

This theory of the development of proleptic γάρ, while it appears plausible if we consider Homer only, fails in accounting for the continuation of this use in classical Greek. Anticipatory γάρ is employed by later authors in all of the various connections in which it is found in the Iliad and Odyssey, namely, at the beginning of a speech anticipating a command or question, in explanations, and in the groups ἀλλὰ γάρ and νῦν δὲ-γάρ, in the latter even more frequently than by Homer.

The more probable hypothesis is, then, that it is, on the one hand, a rhetorical device, consciously employed by Homer, as well as the later Greek masters of style, in imitation of the irregularity of natural speech, where stress of feeling, or politic considerations, break through the rules of logical and grammatical sequence. Its dramatic effect is, as we have stated, that it holds the judgment of the hearer in suspense and prepares for a more favorable attitude toward what is to follow. In explanatory clauses (parenthetical), it is to be considered rather an unavoidable concession of the strict order demanded by grammar, to lucidity of expression.

Baümlein, although not denying that a causal relation usually exists between the γάρ clause and that which follows, holds, that no indication of this relation, is given by the particle, which is not a subordinating conjunction like ἐπεί and therefore, cannot, he believes, point forward. He would, then, class the proleptic γάρ, as it is commonly called, with the original asseverative uses.

Grammatically, γάρ is not as close a bond as ἐπεί yet the forward connection which syntactical subordination necessitates, in the case of ἐπεί, logical subordination requires, in the case of γάρ. You cannot have cause, without that of which it is the cause. As soon as the cause is stated, logical sense demands the other

term of the relation. There can be no confusion. The fact, that the position of γάρ is unusual, creates the desired rhetorical effect, but makes no change in the interpretation of the sentence.

The logical relation, as we have said before, must be considered also from the point of view of the speaker. Does he intend the γάρ to be an emphatic independent sentence, or, does he, with mind intent on what he is to say, prefix the γάρ clause, solely as a means of justifying or confirming the command he is to voice, or the truth he is to state? An examination of a few sentences will make it plain that the speaker, at least, conceives them in the latter relation. He changes the order purposely, because he wishes to prejudice the hearer's mind.

Another test may be used to show the dependent character of the γάρ clause. If the main sentence, (or conclusion, in the terms of Baümlein), is taken away, the reader at once feels that there is an anacoluthon of some kind. It, then, seems arbitrary on an a priori theory, to deny its usual force to a particle on account of a change of order, when it is admitted, that the thought-sequence remains the same.

In the treatment of anticipatory uses of the particle, the usual subdivisions are followed.

I. Causal.

Since the differences, in general, between this and the other meanings of γάρ are discussed at some length in the preceding chapter, we may proceed at once to examine the forms it assumes. (1) The main sentence, introduced by a vocative or some other opening words, may be completed after the γάρ clause, without any indication of the interruption: e.g. Her. I. 8. 10. *Γύγη, οὐ γάρ σε δοκέω πείθεσθαί μοι λέγοντι περὶ τοῦ εἴδεος τῆς γυναικός . . . ποίεε ὅκως ἐκείνην θεήσεαι γυμνήν.*[1] The order here is one, that a person urging an unusual request, naturally follows, if he wishes to soften the effect of the blunt demand, and justify the means by the end. Il. XXIV. 223. *νῦν δ', αὐτὸς γάρ ἄκουσα θεοῦ καὶ ἐσέδρακον ἄντην/, εἶμι, καὶ οὐχ ἅλιον ἔπος ἔσσεται.*[2] (2) The main sentence is very often connected with the preceding by καί, or, some other particle, and the

[1] Cf. Od. XIV. 355. Pind. Py. I. 85, Aesch. Ag. 1069, Choe. 75, Eum. 230, Soph. Phil. 500, 603, O. R. 222, O. C. 1540, Eur. I. T. 646 (cf. for discussion Sern. II. p. 20), Hec. 900, Med. 80, Theoc. Carm. VII. 35. Cf. also instances of a like kind, cited under *νῦν δέ—γάρ* and *ἀλλὰ γάρ* p. 59 f.

[2] Cf. Od. I. 301, Soph. O. C. 1540, Eur. I. T. 95. Arist. Acharn. 1020.

γάρ clause is inserted after one or two words. There is no reason why this particle should be interpreted with the γάρ clause, since it is the thought of the main sentence, which is coordinated or contrasted with that which precedes: e. g. Her. IV. 125. 4. *ἐλαύνων δὲ τὴν ταχίστην τὸν στρατὸν . . . ἐνέκυρσε ἀμφοτέρῃσι τῇσι μοίρῃσι τῶν Σκυθέων, ἐντυχὼν δὲ ἐδίωκε ὑπεκφέροντας ἡμέρης ὁδῷ. καὶ οὐ γὰρ ἀνίει ἐπιὼν ὁ Δαρεῖος, οἱ Σκύθαι κατὰ τὰ βεβουλευμένα ὑπέφευγον . . . .*[1]

(3) The completed principal sentence is introduced by δέ or ἀλλά which are commonly used at the beginning of an apodosis, or a main sentence after a preceding relative clause. It is difficult, where an imperative follows, to determine, whether the δὲ or ἀλλά should be explained in this way, or, should be connected closely with the imperative. In either case the adversative particle marks the beginning of a thought differing from the preceding: e. g. Od. XII. 154 fg. *ὦ φίλοι, οὐ γὰρ χρὴ ἕνα ἴδμεναι οὐδὲ δύ' οἵους/ θέσφαθ', ἃ μοι Κίρκη μυθήσατο, δῖα θεάων· / ἀλλ' ἐρέω μὲν ἐγὼν.*[2] Od. X. 174 fg. *ὦ φίλοι,—οὐ γάρ πω καταδυσόμεθ' . . ./ἀλλ' ἄγετ', ὄφρ' ἐν νηὶ θοῇ βρῶσίς τε πόσις τε μνησόμεθα βρώμης.*[3] . . . Od. XIX. 407. *πολλοῖσιν γὰρ ἐγώγε ὀδυσσάμενος τόδ' ἱκάνω/ ἀνδράσιν . . . / τῷ δ' Ὀδυσεὺς ὄνομ' ἔστω ἐπώνυμον.*[4] Where no words precede the γάρ clause, there is no break in the grammatical structure any more than, when after a conditional sentence, the apodosis is distinguished from the protasis by a δέ or ἀλλά. The change of order has placed the γάρ clause in the position of a subordinate clause, and the δέ or ἀλλά indicates that it is so considered. When the main sentence precedes, there is no necessity for such a symbol.

By a kind of anacoluthon, ἀλλά is sometimes used, where the principal sentence has been introduced by καί. After the long interruption of the γάρ clause, the author forgets that he has used ἀλλά and, having in mind now the connection of the γάρ clause, and the main sentence, rather than the relation of the latter to the previous thought, inserts the ἀλλά, or δέ of apodosis: e. g. Her. IX. 93. 15. *καὶ οὐ γὰρ ἔλαθε τοὺς Ἀπολλωνιήτας ταῦτα γενόμενα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπύθοντο ὑπαγαγόντες μιν ὑπὸ δικαστήριον κατέκριναν. . . .*[5]

[1] Cf. Her. IV. 8. 11. 76. 7, 152. 9, V. 33. 6, 80. 6, VI. 5. 6, 61. 9, 76. 8, 87. 7, 118. 7, VII. 105. 12, IX. 31. 6, 87. 1, Thuc. I. 31. 2, III. 107. 3, VII. 48. 2.

[2] Cf. Od. IV. 722, XIV. 496, (a wish follows ἀλλά) XXII. 70.

[3] Cf. Od. X. 190, XII. 154, XXIII. 248, Il. XIII. 736, Tyrt. Hyp. 1. 1.

[4] Cf. Od. XII. 320, XIII. 208, (νῦν δ' ἀγεθ').

[5] Cf. Brosch. p. 50, who offers the same explanation. Cf. Thucyd. IV. 132.2.

(4) A conclusive particle τῷ (Homer), ὧν (Herod.) τοιγαρῶν may resume the interrupted sentence[1]: e. g. Il. VII. 328 fg. Ἀτρείδη τε καὶ ἄλλοι ἀριστῆες Παναχαιῶν, / πολλοὶ γὰρ τεθνᾶσι κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοί, / . . . τῷ σε χρὴ πόλεμον μὲν ἅμ' ἠόι παῦσαι, Ἀχαιῶν, ...[2] Her. III. 63. 4. Ὦνθρωπε, φῆς γὰρ ἥκειν παρὰ Σμέρδιος τοῦ Κύρου ἄγγελος. νῦν ὧν εἶπας τὴν ἀληθείην ἄπιθι χαίρων.[3] In Soph. O. C. 1000 after an anticipatory γάρ clause of some ten lines, the main sentence when taken up again by ἀνθ' ὧν does not continue the construction, with which it began. σὺ δ', εἰ γὰρ οὐ δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ἅπαν καλὸν / . . . (1010) ἀνθ' ὧν ἐγὼ νῦν τάσδε τὰς θεὰς ἐμοὶ / καλῶν ἱκνοῦμαι καὶ κατασκήπτω λιταῖς / ἐλθεῖν ἀρωγοὺς . . .

A still closer connection often arises between the causal and main sentences, when the latter is introduced by a demonstrative pronoun referring to some person, thing, or place, mentioned for the first time in the γάρ clause. This occurs most commonly in introducing a new person or thing, whose existence, character, and position must be explained before the sentence can proceed: e. g. Il. II. 803 πολλοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ἄστυ μέγα Πριάμου ἐπίκουροι, / ἄλλη δ' ἄλλων γλῶσσα πολυσπερέων ἀνθρώπων· / τοῖσιν ἕκαστος ἀνὴρ σημαινέτω οἷσί περ ἄρχει . . . The number of the auxiliaries and the varied character of the races under the command of the generals make it necessary that each should issue the orders to his own troops. Baümlein p. 76 translates, "Es sind ja in der Stadt viele Hülfsvolken und sie reden verschiedene Sprachen; diese mögen alle je von ihrens Gebietern Befehle empfangen". There is no reason for emphatic assertion of the fact, that there are many auxiliaries in the city. It is well known. The purpose of the speaker in making this statement, is merely to give the reason for the command σημαινέτω.

No different explanation is required in Il. VII. 73. ὑμῖν [μὲν] γὰρ ἔασιν ἀριστῆες Παναχαιῶν· / τῶν νυν ὅντινα θυμὸς ἐμοὶ μαχέσασθαι ἀνώγῃ, / δευρ' ἴτω ἐκ πάντων πρόμος ἔμμεναι Ἕκτορι δίῳ. The text of the clause is uncertain. μέν is the reading of H, C, B, E, G, L, (La Roche) γάρ om. H. Aristarchus, however, reads ὑμῖν δ' ἐν γὰρ ἔασιν. La Roche believes that Appollon. Rhod. B. 882 is an echo of this

[1] Cf. Sern. I. pp. 48 and 9. Cf. the instances under ἀλλὰ γάρ and νῦν δ' γάρ, where the main clause is resumed by the particles mentioned above and also by δή (Euthy. 11C,) διὰ ταῦτα. Prot. 347 A. and like phrases.

[2] Cf. Od. XVIII. 259, XIX. 407, Il. XIII. 228, XV. 738, XVI. 630, XVII. 221, 338, XXIII. 607.

[3] Cf. Her. I. 30. 10, 69. 7, 121. 2, 166. 4, V. 19, 124, VI. 11, 87, VII. 143, Xen. An. III. 2. 25, 29, V. 1. 8, VI. 4. 8. Cf. Brosch. Ch. III. p. 33 fg.

line, namely, ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔασι κυβερνήτηρες, as given by MSS. But, μὲν γὰρ is almost impossible on account of a μὲν γὰρ in the line preceding. In the passage of the Iliad under discussion, the readings of editions differ greatly. ὑμῖν δ' is read by La Roche, Bekker, Dindorf, Nauck, Christ. Cauer reads δέ, and, divides thus ὑμῖν δ'-ἐν γάρ. Düntzer prefers μέν, which he thus interprets "betheuit den einzelnen Satz; Leaf explains in a like manner, but he rejects 69-72, inclusive, as not in harmony with the sense. δ' ἐν, states the latter, has no good MSS authority, and, is doubtless a conjecture, which, there is no ground for attributing to Aristarchus. The text is explicable, he thinks, only on the supposition that μέν is original, and remained untouched, even after the interpolation of 69-72.

Either μέν or δέ, I believe, is a possible reading, as far as the sense is concerned. ὑμῖν δ'—ἐν γάρ may be due to the fusion of two constructions. ὑμῖν belongs to the δέ and γάρ clauses at once, which are in this particular, merged. But δέ must be read, logically with the main clause which is taken up again by the resumptive τῶν. After the remarks about Zeus, which are addressed to both Achaeans and Greeks, Hector turns to the Greeks alone, denoting the change by δέ. But, what should have been ὑμῶν according to the construction following the γάρ clause, is attracted by ἐν of the latter, and becomes dative. The ὑμῖν, therefore, is not repeated in the γάρ clause.[1]

If we read μέν the explanation of the γάρ clause is the same as before, except that it is not, then, parenthetically inserted in the main clause, but precedes.[2]

II. Motivating Anticipatory.

Cause for the change of order in the γάρ clause, performing this function, is not far to seek. Before the speaker utters a statement, question or command, he would naturally wish to incline his hearer to a favorable attitude, by explaining his motive. If the motive followed later, he might not be able to alter the first hasty impression made by the previous words.

(1) To conciliate, in advance, the hearer, a politic compliment is paid to his ability to perform the task, about to be requested. Naturally, where the personal element is predominant, the

[1] Cf. Her. II. 101. 1. for similar attraction and Brosch., p. 63, who gives a like explanation of the instances in Herod.

[2] Cf. for μέν Il. IV. 286.

motivating clause would follow directly the vocative. It causes no break in syntax: e. g. Il. XXIII. 156. *Ἀτρείδη, σοὶ γάρ τε μάλιστά γε λαὸς Ἀχαιῶν / πείσονται μύθοισι, γόοιο μὲν ἔστι καὶ ἆσαι, / νῦν δ' ἀπὸ πυρκαιῆς σκέδασον . . .*[1]. Düntzer notes here, that *γάρ* gives the reason, why the speaker turns to Agamemnon. We must go farther and say that the *γάρ* clause does not motivate his address alone but takes into account his aim in addressing the other. The nature of the command as well as the person addressed, is, in the former's mind from the first, as the motivating clause shows by its content. Reference is made, not merely to the general ability of the person, but, to his ability to perform this particular command.

A question is thus motivated in advance: Eur. Bacch. 477 ΔΙ. *ἀσέβειαν ἀσκοῦντ' ὄργι' ἐχθαίρει θεοῦ / ΠΕ. τὸν θεὸν ὁρᾶν γὰρ φῆς σαφῶς, ποῖός τις ἦν;*

Before dismissing this class it is necessary to note a motivating *γάρ* clause Eur. El. 82, which is made obscure in its reference by the omission of its main sentence. ΟΡ. *Πυλάδη, σὲ γὰρ δὴ πρῶτον ἀνθρώπων ἐγὼ / πιστὸν νομίζω . . . .* (87) *ἀφῖγμαι δ' ἐκ θεοῦ χρηστηρίων / Ἀργεῖον οὖδας οὐδενὸς ξυνειδότος . . . .*[2] Orestes, before revealing to Pylades his secret plans, gives the reason for the confidence in his friend thus shown by stating in the *γάρ* clause his belief in the latter's fidelity. Consequently, the actual revelation of the plans which follows the *γάρ* clause constitutes, in effect the main sentence.

(2) An *ἀλλὰ* or *δὲ* indicates the transition from the motive to the command or statement which the *γάρ* clause anticipates: e. g. Il. XVII, 475. *Ἀλκίμεδον, τίς γάρ τοι Ἀχαιῶν ἄλλος ὁμοῖος / ἵππων ἀθανάτων ἐχέμεν δμῆσίν τε μένος τε / . . . . ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν μάστιγα . . . δέξαι.* Od. XIX. 350, *ξεῖνε φίλ', οὐ γάρ πώ τις ἀνὴρ πεπνυμένος ὧδε / ξείνων τηλεδαπῶν φιλίων ἐμὸν ἵκετο δῶμα, . . . ἔστι δέ μοι γρηὺς πυκινὰ φρεσὶ . . .*[3]

(3) The intervention of the *γάρ* clause is recognized by means of a conclusive particle *τῷ* or *νυν*, showing that the command is the logical consequence of the motives mentioned by the speaker: e. g. Il. XIII. 228. *ἀλλὰ, Θόαν, καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάρος μενεδήιος ἦσθα, / ὀτρύνεις*

[1] Cf. Plat. Gorg. 449 C. Phaed. 117 A, Theae. 148 D, Arist. Lys. 1137.

[2] Cf. Plat. Gorg. 465 A.

[3] Düntzer would refer to the voc. *ξεῖνε φίλε*. The vocative is only a partial indication of Penelope's kindly attitude toward Odysseus, which the *γάρ* clause motivates.

δὲ καὶ ἄλλον, . . . /τῷ νῦν μήτ' ἀπόληγε, κέλευέ τε φωτὶ ἑκάστῳ.[1] Her. I. 124. 4, Ὦ παῖ Καμβύσεω, σὲ γὰρ θεοὶ ἐπορῶσι, . . . σύ νυν Ἀστυάγεα τὸν σεωυτοῦ φονέα τῖσαι.[2]

III. Anticipatory explanations.

Explanatory clauses in general, assume two forms, as I have stated in the discussion of this category in the previous chapter. They are either a development of the main theme, and, therefore, an integral part of the narrative, due to the hearer's ignorance of some detail of the situation, or, to the writer's desire to add an interesting fact by the way. Since their insertion does not affect the current of the thought, their position is determined by the exigencies of the narrative. Where a person must be introduced or a place described, or a circumstance explained, to give a clear understanding of an event about to be related, the explanation naturally precedes. But if the γάρ clause contains information, added, by the way, about a person or thing mentioned in the sentence, there is no reason why it should anticipate that to which it refers. When the explanatory clause is a development of the subject under discussion, naturally, it will not precede the statement of the subject.

(1) No break is made in the grammatical construction by the insertion of the γάρ clause, which is parenthetical in nature: e. g. Her. I. 118. 11. τοῦτο δὲ (σῶστρα γὰρ τοῦ παιδὸς μέλλω θυείν . . .) πάρισθί μοι ἐπὶ δεῖπνον.[3]

Some particle of sequence δή or ὦν resumes the main sentence: e. g. Her. VI. 87. 7. καὶ ἦν γὰρ δὴ τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι πεντετηρὶς ἐπὶ Σουνίῳ, λοχήσαντες ὦν τὴν θεωρίδα νέα εἷλον . . . .[4]

By a backward-pointing demonstrative pronoun, a closer union of the γάρ and main clauses is effected. This device is employed repeatedly when a new person or place is introduced into the narrative: e. g. Her. I. 119. 4. ἐσελθὼν δὲ τὴν ταχίστην, ἦν γάρ οἱ παῖς εἷς μοῦνος . . . τοῦτον ἐκπέμπει . . .[5] τοῦτον would have no meaning without

[1] Capelle Philol. XXXVI. p. 705, translates by German "ja". This may serve as a translation, but it does not adequately express the meaning of the Greek particle. Cf. Od. XVIII. 259.

[2] Cf. Stein ad locum and Brosch. p. 47. Cf. Her. IV. 79. 15, V, 19. 11, Plat. Euthyph. 14 C (δή) Lach. 200 E (οὖν).

[3] Cf. Her. I. 74. 1, 174. 16, VIII. 107. 10, Eur. Alc. 280. Cf. Brosch. p. 44 for full list in Her.

[4] Cf. Her. (νῦν ὦν) I. 121. 4, 129. 8, III. 63. 5, V. 124. 1. Cf. Brosch. pp. 44, 45.

[5] Cf. Her. I. 8. 4, V. 111. 3, VI. 109. 5, VIII. 5. 4, 8. 4.

the preceding γάρ clause, which can not, then, be considered parenthetical. Her. V. 67. 6. τοῦτο δέ, ἡρώιον γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἔστι ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀγορῇ . . . , τοῦτον ἐπεθύμησε ὁ Κλεισθένης. . . .[1] Od. IX. 432. τρεῖς δὲ ἕκαστον φῶτ' ὄιες φέρον. αὐτὰρ ἐγώγε,/ ἀρνειὸς γὰρ ἔην, μήλων ὄχ' ἄριστος ἁπάντων,/ τοῦ κατὰ νῶτα λαβὼν, λασίην ὑπὸ γαστέρ' ἐλυσθεὶς/ κείμην·[2] Od. IX. 319. ἥδε δέ μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή·/ Κύκλωπος γὰρ ἕκειτο μέγα ῥόπαλον παρὰ σηκῷ/ χλωρὸν ἐλαΐνεον· τὸ μὲν ἕκταμεν, ὄφρα φοροίη. . . . Objection may be made, that γάρ introduces a narrative and refers to ἥδε ἀρίστη βουλή. But (1) the analogy of Od. IX 432, where the γάρ clause must be interpreted as an anticipatory explanation, (2) the fact that the ἥδε-βουλή formula is not followed by γάρ in the other five instances[3] in which it is used in Homer, support the other analysis.

[1] Cf. Her. I. 126. 1, VI. 102. 4. (both explanation and cause), III. 78. 14, VII. 44. 10, VIII. 107. 10.

[2] Cf. Od. XI. 69. Ameis treats γάρ in this example as a parenthesis, preparing for the prayer which follows. But the long causal parenthesis, as Pfudel rightly objects, would make the already long invocation, with which the speaker begins, inartistic. The content of the prayer begins with the γάρ clause which looks forward to the command l. 72, in which ἔνθα points back to the preceding explanation.

[3] In two of these cases, there is asyndeton; in the other three, the formula is completed by an infinitive. Cf. Od. IX. 425, which is parallel to the above, in having also a backward-pointing demonstrative at the beginning of the main clause.

CHAPTER IV.

γάρ in question.

In our investigation of γάρ in question, we may at once dismiss from our consideration, the purely rhetorical question, equivalent to a negative statement, and preceded by a definite antecedent, to which the γάρ clause may be referred. Here, the causal force of the particle is undeniable.

But there remains a yet more frequent use of γάρ in question, when γάρ has, apparently, no direct relation to a previous thought, as, for example, at the beginning of a reply. This, in that it is foreign to the idiom of most languages, has been the crux of linguistic students from the earliest times.

Viger (p. 492) recognizes, as a distinct category the γάρ, which "Servit interrogationi", like Latin "nam" or "quisnam". Later, he says, "οὐ γάρ saepe vehementer interrogat".[1] Hoogeveen (note 3, p. 493), in criticism of Viger[2] says that γάρ refers to the preceding sentence and is αἰτιολογικῶς. τίς γάρ does not correspond to quisnam, but, rather, to nam quis. In a number of instances, however, he translates by igitur, itaque, adding as a reason "utpote compositum ex γέ et ἄρα".[3]

Thiersch[4] supports, here, as everywhere, the view that γάρ can have no other than the causal meaning. Hartung,[5] however, who follows next in order of time, reverts to the syllogistic theory, which he defends by a more systematic investigation than the earlier scholars had given to the subject. In γάρ in questions and

[1] Hoog. XII. p. 102, states that Stephanus and Devarius held a similar view, and criticizes them on the same grounds as he does Viger.

[2] Hermann p. 161, ad Vig. likewise opposes Viger and supports the theory, that γάρ is always causal.

[3] In his treatise on particles (p. 101) he makes the ratiocinative-syllogistic use of γάρ include all questions. He translates by "enim", "vero", "ergo." However, he would seem to believe that it is possible, in most instances to trace an underlying causal meaning, by supplying an ellipse.

[4] Cf. § 351, 18. Likewise Matthia § 615 fg., who adds that through frequency of use γὰρ lost its primitive force, and finally was used merely to strengthen the question like the Latin nam in quisnam.

[5] Cf. Vol. I. p. 476 fg.

exclamations, he believes, the syllogistic ἄρα is the predominant part in the compound, and determines its meaning.

To the conclusive γάρ in question Klotz[1] would add the affirmative use, but offers no defense of his view except the interpretation of a few individual cases.

Baümlein adopting the latter meaning, suggested by the previous scholar, supports it by a new etymological explanation of γάρ in question. He believes that it is a relic of the original asseverative use, and serves three purposes, (1) to ask whether a certain fact is an undeniable, indisputable truth, and (2), when following directly after the interrogatives τίς, τί, πῶς, and the like, to introduce a reason for the preceding sentence, and, at the same time, to denote, that the question itself is a natural one, and the doubt expressed by it justifiable, (3) to give more tone and animation to the question, by showing that it is natural and reasonable.

In the analysis of this use of γάρ, Kühner (p. 726) who has accepted, almost completely, Baümlein's theory, differs, in that he adds, to the original asseverative meaning, two derived forces, the causal and conclusive.

Sernatinger[2] II. p. 46 fg. the defender of the causal meaning, sees no obstacle to a like interpretation of the γάρ in question. He concedes, however, that in some instances, this force has been almost completely obscured. This is due, he believes, to a certain brevity and conciseness of expression, manifested in questions, and to a tendency to neglect everything, except that which the questioner desires to know.

Kalinka is, as usual, in harmony with Baümlein, in his interpretation of γάρ, but diverges in his explanation of the chronological relation of the two meanings, causal and affirmative. γάρ in all questions, he holds was originally causal, but in certain developed usages, finally, lost this significance, becoming purely confirmatory. This just mentioned change occurred above all in two kinds of questions, (1) the elliptical formulae of response, which were used in the later sense, without any thought of their origin, and, (2) instances, where the causal meaning of γάρ was obscure, (e. g. Xen. Oec. XVIII. 22), and the confirmatory being the more evident, seemed to be the true force of the particle. Consequently,

[1] p. 245.

[2] So Brosch. p. 7, who follows in this Hermann, Thiersch and Kruger.

in later writers, he believed, the latter meaning completely superseded the former in such formulae as ἦ γάρ and τί γάρ, and even in the fuller questions, e. g. Xen. Mem. I. IV. 14.

To determine indubitably, to what extent the Greek was conscious of the original causal force of γάρ, would be impossible, in the elliptical questions of response. These questions belong to the stereotyped forms, for conveying assent, or dissent, and can be varied by similar questions without γάρ. All such formulae are, in function, confirmatory, but it does not follow, that there is a consequent levelling in the meanings of all of the particles, which might introduce them. πῶς δ' οὐ; is a frequent substitute for πῶς γάρ οὐ; but that the δέ meant the same to a Greek, as the γάρ, cannot be affirmed. Different methods of reasoning are employed in each case. γάρ gives the reason for the implied assent, by directing attention to the impossibility of the opposite proposition. The adversative particle points out this same fact, in protest against the doubt implied by the previous speaker in the very asking of the question, or, if a statement were used, in the tentative form of the statement. Without doubt, this variation in the use of the formulae is nothing more than a stylistic device for relieving the monotony of the recurrent assents and dissents. There is no grammatical likeness between the different forms.

Whether the speaker consciously analyzed γάρ in every case, is not important to the discussion. From the earliest times,[1] the Greeks were familiar with causal γάρ, in a complete question confirming a previous statement, e. g. Her. III. 81. After an expression indicating assent, as well, a similar question was a well recognized usage: e. g. Plat. Phil. 26 E. ΣΩ. ὅρα γάρ, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διά τινα αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι. ΠΡΩ. Ἔμοιγε· πῶς γὰρ ἄν χωρὶς τούτου γίγνοιτο;

There is no reason to believe, that the causal sense of γάρ ceased to be evident, in the next grade of question, in the downward scale to the elliptical formula πῶς γὰρ ἄν; e. g. Plat. Soph. 241 A πῶς γὰρ ἄν ἄλλως τοιοῦτος γένοιτο; Omission of the words giving assent was not sufficient to alter the function of γάρ; nor, again, the ellipse, e. g. Phil. 43 E. of the latter part of the question ἄλλως γένοιτο, which could be readily supplied from the context. Furthermore, the incomplete question was used like the full form,

[1] Cf. Hom. Od. IV. 443.

both after a statement, e. g. Lys. I. 27, and after an expression of assent or dissent, e. g. Laws 901 A ΚΛ. *οὐ μὲν δή· πῶς γὰρ ἄν*;

Since in all of the instances cited above a like logical relation, exists between the *γάρ* clause and the thought preceding it, whether expressed or implied, no grammatical distinction can be made between the uses on the ground of completeness or the opposite. The later Greeks play back and forth continually, between the full and the incomplete questions, in the elliptical and non-elliptical forms of response. Plato, for example, may use, at one time, *Εἰκός, πῶς γὰρ οὐ*; (Laws, 769 E), again *Εἰκός γε*., not followed by a confirmatory clause (Craty. 397 C), or, *Εἰκός γάρ*. (Craty. 424 B), and at another time, the questions with *γὰρ*, e. g. *πῶς γὰρ οὐ*; (Laws, 629 D). Further illustrations may be obtained, by following up almost any other formula of response in the dialogues of Plato.

However, the development of the new meaning of *γάρ* was due, partly, Kalinka believes, to another group of questions in which the causal force was not lost, but only obscured. He cites as instances, Xen. Mem. III. 5. 15, Oec. XVIIII. 2, and Cyr.V. 1. 9.

Kalinka's illustrations do not support his hypothesis. In the first example because *γάρ* directs attention to the circumstances which cause the fact, which is asserted in the preceding sentences, to be true, the function of the whole question, is confirmatory. But this use of *γάρ*, in advancing an argument, in proof of an assertion, is well recognized in declarative sentences, and, would cause no confusion.[1]

γάρ in Oec. XVIIII. 2, is not confirmatory, but motivates a feeling of surprise at a previous remark. Its causal force in this use is attested by the fact that some sentence or exclamation, indicating the surprise, often goes before, e. g. Eur. Alc. 1089. Kalinka evidently confuses with the confirmatory force the asseverative feeling associated with all such emotional questions as that introduced by *γάρ* in this example, which feeling is, however, never conveyed by this particle but by adverbs such as *ὄντως* (Arist. Eccl. 786), and *ἐτεόν*, (Knights 32).

Cyr. V. 1. 9, is similar to the preceding, but there is, in addition a tone of scorn, as is shown by *ἀναγελάσας* in the sentence before.

That there still remains some trace of the orginal causal meaning in these passages, Kalinka is willing to concede, but, in the brief

[1] Cf. p. 22 for fuller discussion.

formulae, such as ἦ γάρ; and τί γάρ; (transitional, e. g. Xen. Mem. II. 6. 2), γάρ has, he asserts, passed altogether to the confirmatory meaning.

With the first of the groups just cited, there is associated an idea of confirmation, which belongs to the question as a whole, not to the γάρ; but the transitional question τί γάρ; is a formula used to indicate sequence. Like explanations can, in no wise, be applied to both, nor can their development have been parallel.

ἦ γάρ; can not be interpreted apart from the other elliptical questions, πῶς γάρ; τί γάρ; etc. employed in verifying. All these, again, differ only, in being incomplete, from the well-known full confirmatory questions with γάρ, which occur from Homer down and the like instances with ἐπεί: e. g. compare Aesch. Ag. 1139, ποῖ δή με δεῦρο τὴν τάλαιναν ἤγαγες; / οὐδέν ποτ' εἰ μὴ ξυνθανουμένην. τί γάρ; (τί γάρ; confirms the assertion, by challenging the hearers to suggest any other possibility), and an ἐπεί Plat. Euthyd. 287 C, used, with similar effect, τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι χρῶμαι, τί ποτε λέγεις, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε; ἦ δῆλον ὅτι ὡς οὐκ ἔχω ἐξελέγξαι αὐτόν; ἐπεὶ εἰπέ, τί σοι ἄλλο νοεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι χρήσομαι τοῖς λόγοις; No distinction in syntax should be made, on the ground of the ellipse. ἦ γάρ; similarly, appeals to the hearer for assurance, in regard to the truth of the statement to which it is subjoined, e. g. Plat. Phil. 25 C. θερμότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθα νῦν δή πού τι καὶ ψυχρότερον. ἦ γάρ; The ἦ indicates, that the speaker presents the previous assertion in question form, and γάρ, that he does this for the purpose of confirmation.

There are a number of other formulae, without γάρ performing a like function, e. g. Plat. Phil. 25 B, ἦ πῶς σὺ φῄς; Phil. 27 A ἦ πῶς; Phil. 60 C, οὐχ οὕτως; In the first two, the disjunctive ἦ excludes the γάρ, but in the latter, the causal link is omitted, as it frequently is in the response-formulae.

A sufficiently exhaustive summary of the uses of γάρ in question will be afforded by the following classification:

I. Confirmatory in rhetorical questions, (1) after statements, (2) in assent and dissent.

II. Justifying an attitude of objection or reproof, or some emotion, surprise, indignation, grief.

III. Motivating a word or phrase.

IV. Explanatory.

V. Transitional.

All of these classes are found in Homer, except, perhaps, the transitional, which, according to the data I have collected, appears

for the first time in Aeschylus. Elliptical confirmatory questions likewise do not seem to have occurred before this author.

I. (1) *γάρ*, in rhetorical questions, substantiating a previous statement, is a well-recognized use of the causal particle. Between this form and that in declarative sentences no distinction can be made, since the question is equivalent to a negative statement. Any other interpretation of *γάρ* in these questions than the causal is made impossible by the parallelism of *ἐπεί*.

As a basis for the discussion of the elliptical forms, however, it will be necessary to cite a few instances of both *γάρ* and *ἐπεί*. Od. IV. 443, *ἔνθα κεν ἀινότατος λόχος ἔπλετο· τεῖρε γὰρ αἰνῶς / φωκάων ἁλιοτρεφέων ὀλοώτατος ὀδμή. / τίς γάρ κ' εἰναλίῳ παρὰ κήτεϊ κοιμηθείη;*[1] Her. III. 81, *ὁ μὲν γάρ εἴ τι ποιέει, γινώσκων ποιέει, τῷ δὲ οὐδὲ γινώσκειν ἔνι· κῶς γὰρ ἄν γινώσκοι ὃς οὔτ' ἐδιδάχθη οὔτε εἶδε . . .*[2]; Arist. Lys. 259, *ἦ πόλλ' ἄελπτ' ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ μακρῷ βίῳ, φεῦ, / ἐπεὶ τίς ἄν πότ' ἤλπισ' ὦ Στρυμόδωρ', ἀκοῦσαι . . .*[3];

Since the confirmatory question usually takes the form of a negative rhetorical question, asking how the opposite can be possible, and would if complete repeat the thought of the main sentence, the interrogative and the particle indicating the logical relation are frequently used alone. A like Greek tendency to avoid repetition is evidenced in the *ἀλλὰ γάρ*, contradicting a negative statement, where the *ἀλλά* clause is, almost invariably, elliptical, e. g. Il. XV. 739. No instances of the incomplete questions are found in Homer or Herodotus, but, beginning with the dramatists, from then on they occur in every author, becoming most common, however, in the colloquial Platonic dialogues. One early occurrence is met in Aesch. Choe. 754, *τὸ μὴ φρονοῦν γὰρ ὡσπερεὶ βοτὸν / τρέφειν ἀνάγκη, πῶς γὰρ οὔ;* a later in Arist. Frogs

[1] This verse is rejected by Hemmings (Telemachie, p. 189), Düntzer, Kirchoff, and Kochly, as not in accord with the sense. To illustrate the effect of the sealskins by the use of the analogy *εἰναλίῳ κήτει* is not illogical. The question implies that their *λόχος* was virtually the same as sleeping by a sea-monster, but not that it was the same.

[2] Cf. Thuc. V. 98, Aesch. Sept. 771, Ag. 1239, 1487, Pr. 1056, Soph. O. R. 1189, 1496, Aj. 279, El. 909, 975, Tr. 829, Eur. I. A. 485, El. 759, Alc. 941, Arist. Wasps 563, 550, 1470, Lys. 526, Thesm. 389, Plut. 485, Eccl. 670, Peace 1027, Birds 339, 343, Isae. I., p. 36, II, Xen. Mem. I. IV. 14, Cyr. V. V. 18, Plat. Crit. 53 A, et freq.

[3] Cf. Plat. Sym. 208 D, Gorg. 461 B, Euthyd. 287 C, Xen. Mem. III. XII. 6, Arist. Clouds 786, Thesm. 553, Dem. XXIV. 125, XXXI. 13, LVI. 25, Epist. 11, 15.

1189, *μά τὸν Δί' οὐ δῆτ', οὐ μὲν οὖν ἐπαύσατο. / πῶς γάρ; ὅτε δὴ πρῶτον . . .*[1] Confirmatory *τί γάρ;* equivalent to our "what else", points out the impossibility, not of the opposite of the preceding thought, as the above, but of any alternative, e. g. Aesch. Ag. 1239, *καὶ τῶνδ' ὅμοιον εἴ τι μὴ πείθω· τί γάρ; / τὸ μέλλον ἥξει.*[2]

Of like character is the *ἦ γάρ;* used so frequently in later Greek, when, by an appeal to the hearers for assurance, the speaker seeks to confirm the statement just made. Sufficiently exact translation of this use would be "for this is true?" or, "surely this is true?" since we are more apt to omit the logical sign. Had the declarative sentence and the following *ἦ γάρ;* question been combined in the form of a rhetorical question, the sense would not have been altered. This most common idiom may be illustrated by a few instances: e. g. Plat. Laws 640 C, ΑΘΗ. *Ἔστι δέ γε ἡ τοιαύτη συνουσία, εἴπερ ἔσται μετὰ μέθης, οὐκ ἀθόρυβος· ἦ γάρ;*[3]

ἦ γάρ; may support a virtual statement, expressed in the interrogative form, e. g. Theae. 182 C, ΣΩ. *κινεῖται, καὶ ῥεῖ, ὥς φατε, τὰ πάντα; ἦ γάρ;*

(2) Where the assent or dissent is made explicit, the confirmatory question which follows does not differ from those discussed above, e. g. Phil. 26 E, ΠΡΩ. *Ἔμοιγε· πῶς γὰρ ἄν χωρὶς τούτου γίγνοιτο;* *ἐπεί* frequently introduces a like question, after some brief indication of the nature of the response, e. g. Gorg. 491 E, ΚΑΛ. *πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκ.* *ἐπεὶ πῶς ἄν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν;*[4]

But by far the more familiar form, after such expressions of assent, is the incomplete question with *γάρ.* It is analogous to the abbreviated question, after statements, in unbroken discourse: e. g. Laws, 769 E. *Εἰκός, πῶς γὰρ οὔ;* 907 A *Εὐφήμει· πῶς γὰρ ἄν;*[5]

Brevity and appropriateness for any context make the short formula a more favored form of response than the complete question. Still, numerous instances of the latter occur, e. g.

[1] Cf. Rep. 379 B, et al.

[2] Aesch. Choe. 880.

[3] Cf. Gorg. 450 C, 451 D, 460 E, 468 C, D, 478 B, 496 A, 499 C, 510 E, 513 D, 520 D, E. For frequency of this formula cf. Ritter, Untersuchungen über Plato, pp. 37 and 57. He finds in those dialogues, which he ascribes to Plato, 47 instances.

[4] Cf. Arist. Clouds 688, *ὀυδαμῶς γ', ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν καλέσειας ἐντυχὼν Ἀμυνίᾳ;*

[5] Cf. Phil. 31 B. et passim.

Plat. Soph. 241 A, *πῶς γὰρ ἄν ἄλλως τοιοῦτος γένοιτο*; Arist. Birds 1219, IP. *ποίᾳ γὰρ ἄλλῃ χρὴ πέτεσθαι τοὺς θεούς*;[1]

Declarative sentences often follow the short formulae and develop further the argument: e. g. Arist. Clouds 1183, ΣΤΡ. *οὐκ ἄν γένοιτο*; ΦΕΙ. *πῶς γάρ*; *εἰ μή πέρ γ' ἅμα αὐτὴ γένοιτ' ἄν γραῦς τε καὶ νέα γυνή*.[2]

To complete the series, a few examples of the briefer forms of reply may be quoted. Others will readily occur to every reader of Greek. Plat. Phil. 35 B, *Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γ' ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, φαμέν.* ΠΡΩ. *πῶς γὰρ οὔ*; 43 D. *οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἄν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαί ποτε ταὐτὸν τῷ χαίρειν*; ΠΡΩ. *πῶς γὰρ ἄν*; Parm. 147 C, *τὶ γὰρ ἄν*;

II. Justifying.

The second category of *γάρ* in question, which may be briefly characterized as justifying, is directly descended from the causal. Unlike the argumentative, it does not challenge the refutation of an assertion, but it raises the question whether a certain act, previously mentioned, was not reasonable and justifiable. This defense is usually called forth by some expression of censure, reproof, or, it may be, merely surprise. An exclamation or question, rejecting with surprise or indignation the criticism, may be prefixed: e. g. Od. V. 23 *τέκνον ἐμὸν, ποῖόν σε ἔπος φύγεν ἕρκος ὀδόντων*; / *οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτον μὲν ἐβούλευτας νόον αὐτὴ*, / *ὡς ἦ τοι κείνους Ὀδυσεὺς ἀποτίσεται ἐλθών*;[3]

But the question alone, by justifying the act, may indicate the attitude of the speaker: e. g. Gorg. 494 E, ΚΑΛ. *Οὐκ αἰσχύνει εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκ.* / *τοὺς λόγους*; ΣΩ. *Ἡ γὰρ ἔγω ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος, ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν, εὐδαίμονας εἶναι*,[4] (Socrates' feeling at the rebuke of Kallias, might be expressed by the Homeric *ποῖον, σε ἔπος* ....), Eur. Bacch. 1366, ΚΑ. *τί μ' ἀμφιβάλλεις χερσίν ὦ τάλαινα παῖ*, / *ὄρνιν ὅπως κηφῆνα πολιόχρων κύκνον*; / ΑΓ. *ποῖ γὰρ τράπωμαι πατρίδος ἐκβεκλημένη*;[5]

In reply to a reproving question, as to whether a person, in truth, intended to perform a certain deprecated act, the defender

[1] Cf. Frogs 739, Birds 611, Plat. Soph. 244 E, Parm. 131 A, Phil. 29 D, 43 A, 50 C, 52 B, Gorg. 480 B.

[2] Cf. Plat. Gorg. 491 E, et al., Laws, 640 C.

[3] Cf. Od. XVII. 382, XXIV. 479, Xen. Mem. II. 3. 16, Arist. Birds. 1606, Plut. 429.

[4] Cf. Aesch. Prom. 987, Soph. Phil. 1383, Ant. 736, 744, O. R. 339, Aj. 1130, 1320, Eur. Hec. 1258, Arist. Plut. 458, Acharn. 594, Frogs 25, Xen. Mem. I. 3. 10.

[5] *γάρ*, here, introduces a justification, after an expression of surprise. Cf. Xen. Cyr. VIII. 3. 4.

may, while justifying his course of action signify, at the same time, his determination to persist, despite the protest made: e. g. Arist. Clouds 1231, ΠΑ. *νῦν δὲ διὰ τοῦτ' ἔξαρνος εἶναι διανοεῖ;/* ΣΤΡ. *τί γὰρ ἄλλ' ἄν ἀπολαύσαιμι τοῦ μαθήματος;*.[1] Two functions are fulfilled by the question, assent and defense.

Through a further extension of its use, a defending question may forestall a possible objection or criticism. *ἀλλὰ γάρ* as we shall see, performs a like function, but with the latter formula, there is inserted another link in the reasoning: e. g. compare Ag. 1374, *Πολλῶν πάροιθεν καιρίως εἰρημένων/ τἀναντί' εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι./ πῶς γάρ τις ἐχθροῖς ἐχθρὰ πορσύνων, φίλοις/ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, πημονῆς ἀρκύστατ' ἄν/ φράξειεν ὕψος κρεῖσσον ἐκπηδήματος;*[2] and Isocr. 269 a-b *καὶ μηδεὶς οἰέσθω μ' ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι τἀναντία τυγχάνω λέγων οἷς ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ λόγῳ φανείην ἂν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γεγραφώς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδένα νομίζω . . . ὅστις οὐκ ἄν ἐπαινέσειέ με καὶ σωφρονεῖν ἡγήσαιτο . . .* The question Ag. 1374 justifies directly the act in despite of the anticipated censure, while *ἀλλά* (Isocr. 269) first rejects the possible reproach, and the *γάρ* clause following then defends the act. The result is the same in both cases and one formula, with a few changes in the external form of the sentence, might be substituted for the other.

III. Motivating.

Repetition of the distinction, between the causal and motivating uses, made in the introduction to the general treatment of *γάρ*, will be unnecessary. There is a close analogy between the use in question and in declarative sentences, except, that by reason of its form the former is more suited to emotional passages than the other.

Within this group, two broad classes may be distinguished, (1) where the *γάρ* motivates a command, question, or, wish, (2) where it motivates some manifestation of emotion—anxiety, perplexity, grief, despair, surprise, objection, and indignation. Division one, is less frequent, since the declarative form is as apt, here, as the question. Some few instances will serve to exemplify the three kinds of sentences, connected with this use: e. g. Od. XIX. 325, *ἀλλά μιν, ἀμφίπολοι, ἀπονίψατε, ...* (322) *τῷ δ' ἄλγιον, ὅς κεν ἐκείνων/ τοῦτον ἀνιάζῃ θυμοφθόρος· . . .* 325, *πῶς γὰρ ἐμεῦ σύ,*

[1] Cf. Arist. Thesm. 544, Peace 1236.

[2] Cf. Soph. El. 59, 226, 257, 1313, Eur. Andr. 938, I A. 901, 1144, Arist. Lys 526, 884, 962, Wasps 1470, Xen. Mem. III. 6, 6.

ξεῖνε, δαήσεαι, εἴ τι γυναικῶν / ἀλλάων περίειμι νόον καὶ ἐπίφρονα μῆτιν, / εἰ κεν αὐσταλέος, κακὰ εἱμένος ἐν μεγάροισι / δαινύῃ.[1] Penelope, after instructing her servants, in regard to the entertainment of the stranger, warns them against any slight to him, and, then, turning to Odysseus, justifies the consideration thus shown. Soph. Tr. 817. ΥΛ. *ἐᾶτ' ἀφέρπειν· οὗρος ὀφθαλμῶν ἐμῶν / αὐτῇ γένοιτ' ἄπωθεν ἑρπούσῃ καλός. / ὄγκον γὰρ ἄλλως ὀνόματος τί δεῖ τρέφειν / μητρῷον, ἥτις μηδὲν ὡς τεκοῦσα δρᾷ;*[2] O. C. 1749, *αἰαῖ, ποῖ μόλωμεν, ὦ Ζεῦ; / ἐλπίδων γὰρ ἐς τίν' ἔτι με / δαίμων τανῦν γ' ἐλαύνει;*[3] Jebb correctly paraphrases "we may well ask, whither we are to go, for, toward what remaining hope is fate now urging us?"

No absolute distinction, between this and the purely emotional use, can be maintained. For example, in the instance above, it cannot be determined, whether the author intended the *γάρ* question to be referred to the feeling of despair evinced both by the exclamation and the question following, or, to the previous question, alone, as revealing a real desire for advice.

Since the various shades of emotion manifested, often approach and intermingle with one another, a minute classification would involve a closer psychological analysis than is necessary for the purposes of this paper. However, in the case of two or three of the emotions, the occurrences are numerous enough to warrant a separate treatment.

(a) Despair, perplexity, grief, regret, associated feelings, are seen in the following group of examples: Soph. Aj. 868 *πόνος πόνῳ πόνον φέρει. / πᾷ πᾷ / πᾷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔβαν ἔγω;*[4] Eur. El. 243, ΟΡ. *δάκνει σ' ἀδελφὸς ὅ τε θανὼν ἴσως πατήρ. / ΗΛ. οἴμοι, τί γάρ μοι τῶνδέ γ' ἐστὶ φίλτερον;*[5] Hec. 1124, ΠΛΜ. *ὤμοι, τί λέξεις; ἦ γὰρ ἐγγύς ἐστί που;*[6]

(b) The question, occasioned by surprise, intermingled with scorn, incredulity, anxiety, or objection, is by far, the most usual form of the emotional use. There are about forty instances in Aristophanes, over half that number in Euripides and Sophocles, each, but with the exception of a few appearances in Homer, Plato, and Xenophon, the idiom is seldom found outside of the dramatists.

[1] Cf. Il. XVII. 475, anticipates a command.

[2] Cf. O. C. 309, where *γάρ* refers, particularly, to *εὐτυχής* in the wish. Cf. Aesch. Choe. 388.

[3] Cf. Arist. Peace 1252, Xen. Mem. II. 1. 15.

[4] Cf. id. 1006, El. 930, Eur. El. 969, Arist. Frogs 33, (regret.)

[5] Grief. Cf. Od. XVI. 70, in which a feeling of objection is blended.

[6] Anxiety rather, cf. Knights 858.

Unlike grief and the allied emotions, instanced in the citations above, surprise is rarely given explicit utterance. The reasons are not obscure. Surprise is an emotion, spontaneously manifested by gesture, look or tone of voice. It does not need to find vent, as grief in wailing, or, as indignation in opprobrium. The first impulse is, preferably, to ask for assurance about the truth of the remark made, or, the reason for the act or expression which has excited the feeling, and although the question is the first verbal indication of the emotion, it is still a justification. For, the other interlocutor has either foreseen or, at least, at once been made aware of the effect of his remark. *ὄντως*, *ἐτεόν* and *ἤδη*, (already,) and the eager *ἦ* are the constant accompaniments of the question, and give to it that asseverative notion, which some translators, erroneously associate with the *γάρ*.

Yet, instances are not lacking, where the feeling is betrayed by a question or exclamation: e. g. Aesch. Pers. 798, *πῶς εἶπας*; *οὐ γὰρ πᾶν στράτευμα βαρβάρων / περᾷ τὸν Ἕλλης πορθμὸν Εὐρώπης ἄπο*;[1] In Arist. Knights 32, scorn and surprise are blended, as is evident from *ποῖον βρέτας* and *ἐτεόν*. *ποῖον βρέτας*; *ἐτεὸν ἡγεῖ γὰρ θεούς*;[2] Plat. Phil. 13 B. shows an intermingling of a tone of objection *πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκ.*; *οἴει γάρ τινα συγχωρήσεσθαι, θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, εἶτα ἀνέξεσθαί σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας ἀγαθὰς [ἡδονάς], τὰς δέ τινας ἑτέρας αὐτῶν κακάς*;[3] No explanation is required of the syntax of *γάρ* in these passages. An attempt to assign to it any other than the causal meaning, causes an awkward asyndeton, and ignores the logical relation of the two sentences.

Questions, which are not preceded by any hint of the emotion are an extension of this usage, as is attested by their similarity in form, and sentiment, and by the analogy of *ἐπεί* with a like ellipse: e. g. Aesch. Choe. 214, ΟΡ. *Εὔχου τὰ λοιπὰ, τοῖς θεοῖς τελεσφόρους / εὐχὰς ἐπαγγέλλουσα, τυγχάνειν καλῶς.* / ΗΛ. *ἐπεὶ τί νῦν ἔκατι δαιμόνων κυρῶ*;

The same gradations of feelings, as in the above, are found in the elliptical *γάρ* questions. Pure surprise is illustrated in Soph. O. C. 222, ΟΙ. *ἄθλιον Οἰδοπόδαν*, ΧΟ. *σὺ γὰρ ὅδ' εἶ*;[4] which

[1] Cf. Eur. Alc. 1089, Med. 670, Arist. Clouds 200, Xen. Oec. IV. 23, Cyr. IV. 2. 13.

[2] Cf. Clouds 1470, Plut. 124, Theocr. V. 5.

[3] Cf. Meno 77 C, Xen. Mem. II. III. 16.

[4] Cf. El. 1193, O. R. 102, 1029, O. C. 539, 542, (elliptical *τί γάρ*) 581, 598, 1583, Aj. 1325, Eur. Sup. 108, 123, 647, Hec. 688, 709, Hel. 105, 590,

emotion is in other instances more clearly marked by the presence of the asseverative adverbs *ἐτεόν* and *ὄντως*, the emphatic *ἤδη* and *ἦ*: e. g. Eur. Her. Main. 610 ΗΡ. *χρόνῳ δ' ἀνελθὼν ἐξ ἀνηλίων μυχῶν/Ἅιδου Κόρης τ' ἔνερθεν οὐκ ἀτιμάσω . . . ./*ΑΜΦ. *ἦλθες γὰρ ὄντως δώματ' εἰς Ἅιδου τέκνον;*[1] Arist. Eccl. 377, ΒΔΕ. *ἀτὰρ πόθεν ἥκεις ἐτεόν;* ΧΡΕ. *ἐξ ἐκκλησίας.* ΒΔΕ. *ἤδη λέλυται γάρ;*[2] Aesch. Prom. 757 ΠΡ. *νῦν δ' οὐδέν ἐστι τέρμα μοι προκείμενον/μόχθων, πρὶν ἂν Ζεὺς ἐκπέσῃ τυραννίδος.* ΙΩ. *ἦ γάρ ποτ' ἔστιν ἐκπεσεῖν ἀρχῆς Δία;*[3] In Eur. Hipp. 322, ΤΡ. *Θησεύς τιν' ἡμάρτηκεν εἰς σ' ἁμαρτίαν;/*ΦΑΙ. *μὴ δρῶσ' ἔγωγ' ἐκεῖνον ὀφθείην κακῶς/*ΤΡ. *τί γὰρ τὸ δεινὸν τοῦθ' ὅ σ' ἐξαίρει θανεῖν;* not surprise so much as wonder and perplexity is evinced by the question. Anxiety and fear again are strongly marked in Her. Main. 1126, ΑΜΦ. *τοσοῦτον ἴσθι τῶν κακῶν, τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ἔα./*ΗΡ. *ἀρκεῖ σιωπὴ γὰρ μαθεῖν ὃ βούλομαι;* and, in Arist. Birds 1402, a question is used to reject, with surprise, an implied reproof, *χαρίεντά γ', ὦ πρεσβῦτ', ἐσοφίσω καὶ σοφά./*ΠΕΙ. *οὐ γὰρ σὺ χαίρεις πτεροδόνητος γενόμενος;*[4] Surprise at the question of another, and objection to the doubt therein implied, are the motives of questions with *γάρ* in a few other instances: e. g. Soph. Phil. 249, ΦΙΛ. *ὦ τέκνον, οὐ γὰρ οἶσθά μ' ὄντιν' εἰσορᾷς;* ΝΕΟ. *πῶς γὰρ κάτοιδ' ὅν γ' εἶδον οὐδεπώποτε;*[5] Arist. Eccl. 667, ΒΔΕ. *οὐδ' αὖ κλέπτης οὐδεὶς ἔσται;* ΠΡΑ. *πῶς γὰρ κλέψει μετὸν αὐτῷ;*[6] where the speaker is impatient at the obviousness of the question asked.

When remonstrance or deprecation of a threatened act is united with surprise, the slightly adversative attitude, manifested in the previous questions, becomes still more prominent: e. g. Il. XV. 201, *οὕτω γὰρ δή τοι, γαιήοχε κυανοχαῖτα,/τόνδε φέρω Διὶ μῦθον ἀπηνέα τε κρατερόν τε . . .;*[7] Aesch. Prom. 974, *ἦ κἀμὲ γάρ τι συμφοραῖς ἐπαιτιᾷ;*[8]

Her. Main. 1198, Ion. 954, Or. 1113, Cyc. 154, Arist. Birds 102, 110, 300, 355, 1235, 1386 (disbelief), 1505, Ach. 1211, Clouds 1179, Eccl. 771, 932, Peace 721, Lys. 489, Xen. Oec. XI. 9, XIX. 1.

[1] Cf. Or. 739 (*ὡς ἀληθῶς*). Cf. Arist. Plut. 286, Eccl. 786.

[2] Cf. Soph. O. C. 385, Eur. Hel. 107, Her. 672, Arist. Eccl. 717.

[3] Cf. Soph. Phil. 248, 322, 654, O. R. 1000, 1039, 1173, O. C. 64, El. 1221 (note *πῶς εἶπας*; in previous question of same speaker showing the general feeling) Eur. Hel. 784, Hec. 765, 1047.

[4] Cf. Plut. 1027, Knights 353, Ach. 594, Frogs 25, Plat. Phaedr. 234 D.

[5] Cf. Eur. Bacch. 1366, Xen. Mem. I. 3. 10.

[6] Cf. Arist. Birds 1526.

[7] Cf. Soph. Ant. 770.

[8] Cf. Prom. 745, Eur. Her. Main. 1142, Arist. Birds 1430 Xen. Cyr. IV. 5. 44.

(c) Between the just mentioned group, in which an undertone of objection is mingled with the feeling of surprise, and the questions now to be considered, wherein objection is the predominant, and surprise or perplexity a minor tone, it is difficult to establish a hard and fast dividing line. In the latter class the γάρ question, suggesting the cause of the perplexity and consequent objection, is usually the only verbal expression given the adversative feeling. Yet there can be no doubt of the sense of objection, since some few passages with ἀλλὰ are found of sufficient similarity to the elliptical instances, to prove indisputably the feeling conveyed by the latter: e. g. Arist. Peace 222, ΕΡΜ. ὃν οὔνεκ' οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ ποτ' Εἰρήνην ἔτι/ τὸ λοιπὸν ὄψεσθ'. ΤΡΥ. ἀλλὰ ποῖ γὰρ οἴχεται;[1]

Failure to observe this adversative attitude in other analogous questions has been a fruitful source of new interpretations for the particle: e. g. Arist. Birds 89, ΕΥΕ. εἰπέ μοι/σὺ δὲ τὴν κορώνην οὐκ ἀφῆκας καταπεσών;/ΠΕΙ. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΕΥΕ. ποῦ γάρ ἐστιν;[2] Bekker translates "Ubi igitur est", which may serve as a convenient translation, but the Latin particle does not correspond to the γάρ in its logical connection with the preceding remarks, for the former (igitur) denotes, that the question is the result of the acceptance of the answer, the latter (γάρ), that it is the cause of the doubt shown in the answer.

In another series of examples, an objection is raised against the tenor of a question or reply, on the ground that it is not apt, does not remove the difficulty, or is based on a wrong conception of certain, fundamental principles: e. g. Aesch. Eum. 427. ΧΟ. φονεὺς γὰρ εἶναι μητρὸς ἠξιώσατο./ΑΘ. ἄλλαις ἀνάγκαις ἤ τινος τρέων κότον; ΧΟ. ποῦ γὰρ τοσοῦτο κέντρον ὡς μητρονκτονεῖν;[3] In the above citation demurrer is made to the question of Athene, on the plea that such excuses, as she suggests, are not sufficient to justify a matricide.

An objectionable word in a previous remark is taken up in the retort, Soph. Aj. 1126, and repeated in an emphatic position in the

[1] Cf. Arist. Lys. 463, Acharn. 594.

[2] Cf. Aesch. Ag. 272, 1366, Eur. Alc. 1143, (It is possible to interpret the question here, as transitional, asking for further information. Still, it would seem to indicate, that Admetus doubts Heracles' assurance that his wife has returned from death.) Arist. Clouds 342, Peace 41, Birds 289, Eccl. 767, Plat. Gorg. 469 B.

[3] Cf. Eum. 211. 607. Some editors punctuate after γάρ. The question may then be considered transitional. It is, however, more nearly akin to the instances above. The thought is "you should not confine yourselves to the slayers of mothers, alone, for, what say you of a wife, who slays her husband?"

γάρ clause, which justifying, as well as indicating the objection then inquires whether the word was rightly applied in the circumstances, which it proceeds to describe. ΤΕΥ. *ξὺν τῷ δικαίῳ γὰρ μέγ' ἔξεστιν φρονεῖν./*ΜΕ. *δίκαια γὰρ τόνδ' εὐτυχεῖν κτείναντά με;*[1]

Dissent from the suggestion of another, or, reluctance to obey a command, may be indicated, by a γάρ question, drawing attention to the obstacles which make the task difficult: e. g. Od. X. 501, *ὦ Κίρκη, τίς γὰρ ταύτην ὁδὸν ἡγεμονεύσει;/εἰς Ἄιδος δ' οὔ πώ τις ἀφίκετο νηὶ μελαίνῃ.*[2]

When accompanied by other emotions, such as grief, or indignation, an attitude of objection is expressed by an exclamation or a statement rather than by the purely adversative ἀλλά: e. g. Od. XVI. 70, where a declarative sentence contains, at the same time, a rejection of a proposal and a protestation of pain thereat. *Εὔμαι', ἦ μάλα τοῦτο ἔπος θυμαλγὲς ἔειπες·/πῶς γὰρ δὴ τὸν ξεῖνον ἐγὼν ὑποδέξομαι οἴκῳ;*

A question in Il. I. 123, has for its major note indignation, as is manifest from the reproachful epithet; nevertheless it is, in thought content, an objection, in that it draws attention to the obstacles, which make compliance with Agamemnon's demand impossible, *Ἀτρείδη κύδιστε, φίλοκτεανώτατε πάντων,/πῶς γάρ τοι δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί; . . ./ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν νῦν τήνδε θεῶ πρόες.* Classen p. 6 refers γάρ to the following command. Piderit (review of Classen, Jahresb. pp. 70 and 73,) criticizes him on the ground, that impossibility of recompense could not motivate the command to return the maiden; Agamemnon consents to give up his captive, but only on condition, that he be recompensed, to which condition in particular Achilles objects. Pfudel p. 21, would connect *πῶς γάρ* with the words of Agam. 118, *αὐτὰρ ἐμοί γέρας . . .* Doederlein believes that γάρ explains a gesture of refusal, which, translated into words would be *οὐ γενήσεται*, Naegelsbach and Düntzer refer γάρ to *φιλοκτεανώτατε*, but, translate by Germ. "ja", which does not denote relation. By referring the particle to *φιλοκτεανώτατε*, they must mean that it justifies the use of these epithets and, accordingly, the feeling which the epithets suggest.

[1] Cf. id. 1133, Ant. 730, 732, 734, Phil. 250, Eur. Alc. 711, Or. 1600.

[2] Cf. Soph. Phil. 1405, which may be thus interpreted, or, punctuating after γάρ, as a transitional question introducing a new objection. Cf. *ἀλλὰ γάρ* p. 52. The readings of all except two MSS (in Od. X. 501) is γάρ. For discussion of γάρ and τάρ in Homer, see appendix (to be published later). Cf. Arist. Lys. 910, Eur. El. 969 (grief is blended, *φεῦ* precedes), Od. III. 22, XV. 509.

In other passages there is no previous voicing of the indignation but an impatient question alone with *γάρ*, setting forth the reasons for the refusal of a request, conveys clearly the emotion which actuates the speaker: e. g. Od. X. 337, *ὦ Κίρκη, πῶς γάρ με κέλεαι σοι ἤπιον εἶναι;/ἦ μοι σὺς μὲν ἔθηκας ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἑταίρους.*[1]

With the above may be noted the instances in which the argument, claim, or threat of another is rejected with contempt and indignation. Idiomatic *ἄληθες* warns the hearer of the attitude to be expected: e. g. Arist. Birds 1047, ΕΠΙ. *καλοῦμαι Πεισθέταιρον ὕβρεως ἐς τὸν μουνιχιῶνα μῆνα./*ΠΕΙ. *ἄληθες, οὗτος; ἔτι γὰρ ἐνταῦθ' ἦσθα σύ;*[2] No indication of the feeling motivated, precedes the question in Eur. Andr. 590, ΜΕ. *ψαῦσόν γ', ἵν' εἰδῇς, καὶ πέλας πρόσελθέ μου./*ΠΗ. *σὺ γὰρ μετ' ἀνδρῶν, ὦ κάκιστε κάκ κακῶν;* Her. III. 120, *Σὺ γὰρ ἐν ἀνδρῶν λόγῳ, ὃς βασιλέι νῆσον Σάμον πρὸς τῷ σῷ νομῷ προσκειμένην οὐ παρεκτήσαο . . .;*[3]

(d) The questions, discussed above, in which objection and indignation are united form the transitional link to another series, belonging to the sphere of pure indignation, in which, condemning an act, the person, instead of advancing the reasons for his objection, angrily asks the other interlocutor whether he has actually dared, or will dare to perform the deprecated act. Words, such as these, "I may well be angry, for will you dare . . . ?" might voice the indignation which occasions the question. Indignant exclamations, or, insulting epithets, accompanying the questions, frequently betoken the feeling: e. g. Soph. Tr. 1124, ΗΡ. *ὦ παγκάκιστε, καὶ παρεμνήσω γὰρ αὖ/τῆς πατροφόντου μητρός, ὡς κλύειν ἐμέ;* O. C. 863, *ὦ φθέγμ' ἀναιδές, ἦ σὺ γὰρ ψαύσεις ἐμοῦ;*[4] A good illustration of the difference between Greek and English idiom in such questions is found in the Shakespearean parallel "Wilt thou lay hands on me, villain?" (As You Like It. Act 1, Sc. 1.)

A similar example, yet, lacking the epithets is Eur. I. A. 325; no doubt can be felt concerning the passion which inspires the

[1] Cf. Od. X. 383, Arist. Wasps 1159.

[2] Cf. id. 1051, 1606, Plut. 429.

[3] Brosch., Rawlinson, and Lange rightly read as question. Brosch. thinks that the reproach contained in the previous *προφέροντα* is defended by the *γάρ* question. I prefer, with Stein, to understand some thought like *οὐδέν σοι μέτεστι ἀρετῆς*, before the question. The reproach, contained in the question, then, supports this assertion, which is a denial of the claims of the other person referred to in the context immediately before.

[4] Cf. Eur. Or. 1595, Phoen. 1673, Andr. 249, Arist. Clouds 57, Thesm. 1095.

question. ΑΓΑ. *ἦ γὰρ οἶσθ' ἃ μή σε καιρὸς εἰδέναι,/ σήμαντρ' ἀνεῖς;* ΜΕ *ὥστε σ' ἀλγῦναι γ', ἀνοίξας, ἃ σὺ κάκ' εἰργάσω λάθρᾳ.*[1] Indignation at the act of some person not taking part in the dialogue, again, is the motive of a question, Arist. Wasps 1299, *οὐ γὰρ ὁ γέρων ἀτηρότατον ἄρ' ἦν κακόν,/καὶ τῶν ξυνόντων πολὺ παροινικώτατος;*[2]

IV. Explicative.

Although the instances of explanatory *γάρ* in question form are comparatively rare, the clearly defined character of the few, which occur, compel us to recognize the use as a distinct category:[3] e. g. Od. XX. 42, where a preceding *τόδε* points forward to the question *πρὸς δ' ἔτι καὶ τόδε μεῖζον ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζω·/εἴπερ γὰρ κτείναιμι Διός τε σέθεν τε ἕκητι,/πῇ κεν ὑπεκπροφύγοιμι;* Arist. Clouds 370 *σημείοις* is expanded by a like question. *μεγάλοις δέ σ' ἐγὼ σημείοις αὐτὸ διδάξω./φέρε, ποῦ γὰρ πώποτ' ἄνευ Νεφελῶν ὕοντ' ἤδη τεθέασαι;*

V. Transitional.

The causal particle introducing a question of transition is an idiom, peculiar to Greek and Latin. In translation into the modern languages, when not wholly disregarded, it is represented by some particle of sequence. This fact, however, is not a sufficient basis for the conclusion, that its use is a survival of the original *γέ ἄρα* force, or, that the *γάρ* in later Greek had developed a new meaning of sequence. Such an inference, would overlook the parallelism of *γάρ* in another transitional formula *ἀλλὰ γάρ*, where the particle is often equally untranslatable. That *γάρ* with the interrogative has a tendency to usurp the functions of *ἀλλὰ γάρ*, is supported by the like use of both forms in conveying an objection.[4] In the former case, the very fact that the speaker asks the question, suggesting some doubt or difficulty, shows that he does not agree with the statement of the other interlocutor. Consequently, explicit utterance of the objection is not necessary, although, in a few instances *ἀλλά* or its equivalent is prefixed.

Likewise, in the transitional use, the interrogative form allows the omission of the interrupting *ἀλλά*. For, while a declarative sentence could not easily signify that a new topic is introduced, without the formal expression of transition, since some symbol is required to warn the hearer of a break in the old line of thought,

[1] Note the reply (*ἀλγῦναι*); to arouse the feeling of indignation motivated by the *γάρ* question, was the purpose of the censured act.

[2] Cf. Acharn. 576, Xen. Mem. III. IV. 1.

[3] For general discussion of explicative *γάρ* see p. 14.

[4] Cf. p. 47.

the interrogative, on the other hand, beside arresting the attention, has associated with it that slightly contrasting sense, which makes an ἀλλά unnecessary. But, it must be recognized that the interrogative is not the syntactical equivalent of the other; γάρ does not give the reason for any idea conveyed in its own clause, but for the intention to change the topic or pass to a new item in the same, present in the mind of the speaker. In the one case, this idea is conveyed by ἀλλά, but in the other, must be inferred from the context. Possibly, in conversation, where most of the instances occur, facial expression and gesture were effective aids in indicating transition. For example, in Arist. Clouds 218, it is probable that Strepsiades pointed to the new objects of interest with some show of surprise. ΣΤΡ. *νὴ Δί', οἰμώξεσθ' ἄρα./φέρε τίς γὰρ οὗτος οὑπὶ τῆς κρεμάθρας ἀνήρ;*[1] Abrupt φέρε also assisted in diverting the attention of the hearer from the old subject to the new. Likewise, Arist. Knights 1002 the γάρ may be referred to *φέρ' ἴδω*, which introduces the new topic, *φέρ' ἴδω, τίνος γάρ εἰσιν οἱ χρησμοί ποτε*; In a series, the completion of one member indicates clearly enough, that the speaker will turn to the next in order: e. g. Soph. Phil. 651, ΝΕΟ. *ἀλλ' ἔκφερ' αὐτό. τί γὰρ ἔτ' ἄλλ' ἐρᾷς λαβεῖν;*[2] Neoptolemus, by performing the first task requested, signifies that he is ready for further orders.

[1] Cf. Clouds 191, Birds 299.

[2] Cf. Aesch. Ag. 630, 634, Pers. 239, Soph. Aj. 101, Phil. 327, Arist. Clouds 351, 403, Peace 838, Birds 1501, Xen. Oec. XVII. 6, 14, Mem. II. VI. 2, Cyr. I. VI. 5, 12, Theoc. XXII. 115.

CHAPTER V.

ΑΛΛΑ ΓΑΡ

The exact syntactical analysis of ἀλλὰ γάρ has been, for the past century, a moot question. Logically, a sentence cannot bear, at once, an adversative and causal relation to its foregoing narrative. ἀλλά, an adversative conjunction and γάρ, of which the traditional interpretation is "for", are found, both separated, and in juxtaposition, with one predicate only, following. To what the γάρ refers is not clear at the first glance, since the context seems to require only the adversative idea. The ready inference is, that γάρ cannot be conjunctive.

Recourse is had here, as in the other more obscure uses of γάρ to etymology, the interpretative value of which has been discussed above.

Hartung, for example, (Vol. I. p. 470,) sees no difficulty in the combination of ἀλλά and causal γάρ. Since the latter particle is compounded of γέ and ἄρα, it is corresponsive, but not conjunctive; consequently, it may be combined with conjunctions, without demanding for itself a separate sentence. Although he classifies ἀλλὰ γάρ among the argumentative-explicative uses, he prefers to translate by German "eben", or "ja".

Baümlein (p. 70,) Kühner, (II p. 725,) and Schraut (pp. 54 & 55) follow Hartung in assigning the two particles to the same sentence, when there is only one predicate. They hold that γάρ bears its original confirmative force, and is an adverbial, not a conjunctive particle; that causal γάρ clauses, inserted in an ἀλλά main sentence with one or more words intervening, between the two particles, must be a distinct class, γάρ being here conjunctive and introducing a parenthesis. Yet, when the juxtaposed particles, are followed by two distinct sentences, which happens rarely, Baümlein, while, apparently, interpreting the γάρ as causal, assigns both particles to one sentence, and assumes the omission of some conclusive particle with the second, while Kühner explains the combination, as the result of an intermingling of the causal and adversative sentences.

Supporters of the traditional interpretation of γάρ in this combination are not lacking, namely, Viger, p. 472, n. 67, Devarius,

(ed. Klotz), Vol. I. p. 121, Hoogeveen, p. 106, Sec. V, Thiersch, p. 302, 11, n. 6, Matthia, No. 615. 11, Krüger, No. 64. 14, (4,) Sernatinger, part 2, p. 23 fg., Broschman, p. 58 fg. These scholars all agree that the γάρ is primarily causal, and, that it is inserted in the ἀλλά sentences, to anticipate the thought which follows.

As regards the incomplete formula, there is some difference of opinion. Hoog. (p. 106, under γὰρ οὖν I.) and Krüger (No. 69. 14), insist that an ellipse must always be supplied. Devarius believes that the group may sometimes be treated as the equivalent of ἀλλ' ὅμως. Matthia, likewise, compares the particles to the Latin "enim vero" but, with the reservation, that it is always possible to restore the original form. Klotz (Vol. II. Sec. I. p. 22), will not concede that γάρ loses its causal force even in the most extreme cases. Sernatinger and Broschman, wherever there is a sentence following, with which the γάρ can be connected, though the grammatical construction be broken by a new particle, for example, a conclusive or an adversative, believe it is unnecessary to supply an ellipse after the ἀλλά. Where the ἀλλά is completely elliptical, they think it prolix, to supply in precise words, what the author has rightly omitted, as readily understood.

Kalinka, whose theory in regard to the history of γάρ in general we have mentioned above, takes a stand between the two opposing groups of scholars, the supporters of the new etymological interpretation, and those who uphold the traditional. He believes that the original force of γάρ in this combination was causal, and that later from the frequent omission of the words completing the main clause, γάρ "per transgressionem", was placed directly after ἀλλά. This very fact, namely that γάρ could follow immediately the ἀλλά, proves, he maintains, that the causal force was no longer felt, and that the particle had become purely confirmatory. His especial aversion is the ellipse hypothesis, which he deprecates in these words: "atque ut aliquam veri speciem opinioni suae adiciant (some of the earlier editors, e. g. Gebauer), ad tam artificiosas violentas ellipses confugere coguntur, ut si eos omnino ad interpretandum adhibere liceat, hoc modo quidvis possis demonstrare".

The glaring inconsistency in the theory expounded by Baümlein and his school, arises in the different significations, which they are forced to ascribe to ἀλλά-γάρ elliptical and complete, because the adverbial interpretation given by them to γάρ in the elliptical instances, produces an awkward asyndeton if

applied to the completed formulae. But any difference in the explanation of the formulae is forbidden by the evident similarity of context in many instances. Consistency, for example, requires one rendering of *ἀλλά γάρ* in the following series of citations, all of which belong to the same period, and perform the same function. (*ἀλλά* is adversative, and, announces an interruption or change in the course of the speech at the approach of a third person.) In these successive, related examples, the particles are exhibited in all stages, from *ἀλλά* completed, followed in regular order by *γάρ*, to the elliptical juxtaposed group. Arist. Lys. 1106, ΛΑΚ. *ναὶ τὼ σιώ, καλῆτε τὰν Λυσιστράταν./* ΑΘ. *ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ καλεῖν·/αὐτὴ γάρ, ὡς ἤκουσεν, ἥδ' ἐξέρχεται.* Eur. Hel. 1385, *ἀλλ' ἐκπερᾷ γὰρ δωμάτων ὁ τοὺς ἐμοὺς/γάμους ἑτοίμους ἐν χεροῖν ἔχειν δοκῶν,/σιγητέον μοι·* id. Or. 725, *οὗτος γὰρ ἦν μοι καταφυγὴ σωτηρίας. / ἀλλ' εἰσορῶ γὰρ τόνδε φίλτατον βροτῶν/Πυλάδην δρόμῳ στείχοντα . . ./ἡδεῖαν ὄψιν·* Plat. Theae. 144 C, *Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοὔνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὔ. ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐστι τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ . . . . ἀλλὰ σκόπει, εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτόν.* Eur. Phoen. 1307, *ἀλλὰ γὰρ Κρέοντα λεύσσω τόνδε δεῦρο συννεφῆ/πρὸς δόμους στείχοντα, παύσω τοὺς παρεστῶτας γόους.*

Greek is the best commentary on itself. With a few changes, necessitated by the variation of context, the *ἀλλά* sentence of Arist. Lys. 1106, might be supplied after that particle in Theae. 144 C *ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἐμὲ, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ μνημονεύειν, ἐστι γὰρ τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ . . .* Close analogy, again, in Eur. Hel. 1385, where the particles are separated, and, Eur. Phoen. 1307, demands the same analysis in both instances.

Lastly, the chronological development is not in harmony with the theory of Baümlein. As is shown in the table given below, the complete expressions are more frequent in the earlier authors, than the elliptical, but in the later orators and philosophers, the juxtaposed particles supersede almost completely, the other forms.

Author.	Complete.	Elliptical.	Juxtaposed.
Homer,	4	4	0
Pindar,	2	3	3
Aeschylus,	0	2	1
Herodotos,	9	5	8
Sophocles,	10	6	2 (one not ellipt.)
Euripides,	13	10	3 (")
Aristophanes,	3	4	1

Author.	Complete.	Elliptical.	Juxtaposed.
Andocides,	0	0	6
Lysias,	0	3	9
Isocrates,	0	0	30
Demosthenes,	0	0	9
Xenophon,	0	3	20
Plato,	0	8	53

Now if γάρ were originally affirmative, we should expect the history of the group to be reversed. The elliptical formulae, in which γάρ bears its primitive, etymological force would be the earliest to appear; juxtaposition of the particles would be frequent from the first, since there could be no logical obstacle to the close combination of an adversative and an affirmative particle, and it is the natural tendency of γάρ to claim everywhere the second place in the sentence. Throughout the history of the group the predominant meaning of γάρ would have been affirmative, not causal. Instances of parenthetical γάρ inserted in an ἀλλά clause, would be a later growth, the result of chance arrangement, having no historical relation to the recognized group ἀλλὰ γάρ.

Another possibility, however, must be considered. As Kalinka suggests, the primal meaning of γάρ in this group, may have been one of cause, but have been superseded by the later-developed confirmatory. At what stage in the evolution did the change occur? Kalinka answers, when ἀλλά and γάρ were directly combined, for, the causal and adversative relations could not be so blended.

No objection can be made to the general principle, on which his theory is based, namely, the incompatibility of adversative and causal ideas in one sentence. But before his conclusion can be accepted, we must ascertain whether it is supported by the actual use of the group in literary Greek. Has ἀλλὰ γάρ combined, a different sense and grammatical relation from the separated form? Are they not used interchangeably, in the same period?

To answer these questions no further citations are needed than those on p. 54. As has been stated, these examples, belonging to the same period, and bearing the same meaning, exhibit ἀλλὰ γάρ in all combinations.

Position alone, then, cannot be accepted as indisputable evidence of the meaning of γάρ.

Lastly, if Kalinka's theory be true, the two particles when directly combined can never be referred to different sentences, since γάρ has lost its original conjunctive power. What interpretation, then, must be given to Eur. Phoen. 1307, and other like instances cited elsewhere?

Such sentences point to another conclusion which might follow from Kalinka's premise, that a sentence cannot be both causal and adversative, namely that in the Greek there was no conflict of logical relations, since the two particles were construed with separate sentences. But, the ready objection of all supporters of the affirmative theory, both of Baümlein's and of Kalinka's school, will be, that we must resort, then, to the tortuous and artificial ellipses. The elaboration of an ellipse, says Forman, "can only be defended by rote, not by reason".

Unfortunately, many of the earlier scholars insisted on the full expression of the ellipse in certain fixed forms. That the Greek hearer was conscious of an ellipse, whenever he heard ἀλλὰ γάρ and mentally supplied the fuller expression cannot be affirmed. But, whether we must supply the ellipse in translation is one question, whether ἀλλά in the Greek performed the function of a whole sentence, which might be elaborated in various ways, is another.

In answering the latter question, we must bear in mind that nicer logical analyses were made by the Greeks than by modern peoples, for example, English or German. The former have as scrupulous a conscience for expressing the reason for an ἀλλὰ feeling, as for explaining some objective fact. We however fail to recognize, in our speech, relations as entities demanding explanation. James remarks this inadequacy of language in his Psychology, Vol. I. p. 245. "We ought to say a feeling of 'and', a feeling of 'if', a feeling of 'but', and a feeling of 'by', quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue or a feeling of cold. Yet we do not; so inveterate has our habit become of recognizing the existence of the substantive parts, alone, that language almost refuses to lend itself to any other use".

Shakespeare recognizes this possibility of speech in objectifying "but yet". Ant. and Cleopat. Act II. Sc. 5, "I do not like 'but yet', it does allay the good precedence; fie upon 'but yet'. 'But yet' is as a gaoler to bring forth some monstrous malefactor". In this psychological fact, lies, I believe, the solution of the peculiarity of Greek syntax under discussion.

Nor do the Greeks show this tendency to hypostatize feelings as feelings in ἀλλὰ γάρ only. In γάρ in question, we see that they differentiate the emotion and the cause for the emotion contained in the question, as separate entities. On the other hand, the modern races express the fact, alone, that occasions the feeling, without giving objective indication of the feeling, by an insertion of the logical link connecting the unexpressed feeling and the fact. If we recognize, then, the different methods of expression observed in these languages, the possibility of translating ἀλλὰ γάρ by an adversative particle without the causal symbol, affords no evidence in regard to the syntax.

Still more conclusive argument for the causal force of γάρ is afforded by the parallel use of ἐπεί, such as is found in the following group of examples, where ἀλλά introduces a change in a course of action, due to the reasons given in the γάρ or ἐπεί clauses: e. g. Od. XIV. 355, *οἱ δὲ μεγάλα στενάχοντες/φοίταον. ἀλλ' —οὐ γάρ σφιν ἐφαίνετο κέρδιον εἶναι/μαίεσθαι προτέρω—τοὶ μὲν πάλιν αὖτις ἔβαινον . . . .* Od. V. 137, *ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὔ πως ἔστι Διὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο/οὔτε παρεξελθεῖν ἄλλον θεὸν οὔθ' ἁλιῶσαι,/ἐρρέτω, εἴ μιν κεῖνος ἐποτρύνει καὶ ἀνώγει, ...* Her. IX. 46, *. . ἐν νόῳ ἐγένετο εἰπεῖν ταῦτα τά περ ὑμεῖς φθάντες προφέρετε. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀρρωδέομεν μὴ ὑμῖν οὐκ ἡδέες γένωνται οἱ λόγοι.* ἐπεί could be substituted for γάρ or the causal sign omitted as in Eur. Phoen. 99 *ἀλλ' οὔτις ἀστῶν τοῖσδε χρίμπτεται δόμοις,/κέδρου παλαιὰν κλίμακ' ἐκπέρα ποδί.* and no change would result in the relation of the main and logically subordinate clauses.

Between the ἐπεί and the γάρ clauses the only ground for distinction is the irregularity in the position of the latter; for, while the ἐπεὶ clause, that is subordinate in syntax, and constitutes, accordingly, an integral part of the main sentence, may anticipate the thought which it motivates, without disturbing the order, the γάρ clause, that is as independent as the sentence which it expounds, naturally, should follow that for which it gives the reason.

From the examples quoted above, and on p. 54 a probable hypothesis in regard to the origin and growth of the combination, might be deduced, although all theories about language conditions before the literary period, are necessarily more or less conjectural.

The full and regular expression, such as we find Arist. Lys. 1106, would, in all likelihood, be the first, since the interposing of the γάρ clause, like the use of parenthesis, is a method of subordination and presupposes sentence analysis.

Next in order would follow, through a desire to emphasize its content, the insertion of the γάρ clause in the main sentence.

When this stage has been reached, it might be expected, that the completion of the intercepted main sentence would frequently be neglected, since the subsequent action or context, supplemented by the γάρ clause would show the particular form which the adversative feeling conveyed by ἀλλά assumed. This ellipse of the main sentence is, furthermore, made possible by the ability of the Greek to motivate a mere indication of relation or feeling as well as an objective fact.

Juxtaposition of ἀλλὰ γάρ would be the natural consequence of the ellipse when the usage of this group had become accepted and frequent in certain easily recognized senses, because, now that the ἀλλά no longer introduces a sentence but merely suggests the adversative relation, it is reasonable that γάρ with its marked tendency to usurp the second place in the sentence in which it occurs, should be inserted directly after ἀλλά, and from its position, seemingly claim that sentence as its own. But that in this final development the grammatical relation of γάρ and ἀλλά was never forgotten, is indisputably proven by the fact, that in the latest period of classical Greek literature (Aristotle) a writer can always revert to the full formula or even complete ἀλλά in the juxtaposed group.

Some of the confusion shown in the explanation of the syntax of these particles is due to the erroneous supposition that the meanings of this combination may be roughly divided into two classes: e. g. one comprising those instances in which ἀλλά γάρ conveys objection, and the other class, those in which the particles are translated: "but be that as it may" or "but the truth is".[1] A more searching investigation will discover as many distinctions as there are shades of adversative feeling denoted by ἀλλά, of which distinctions the examples, moreover, are not isolated but constitute certain clearly marked groups. Undeniable analogy between the parts of these several groups forbids any variation in interpretation such as might be based on differences of position or fulness of expression.

In the brief summary of the uses of ἀλλὰ γάρ which follows, the main divisions only are noted. When discussing individual instances, a more minute distinction is essential.

[1] Cf. Riddel, Digest Plat. Idioms, Ed. of Apol. Holden, note to Xen. Cyr. VII. I. 49. Thiemann, Worterbuch zu Xen. Hel. recognizes only two uses the one in objection, and the transitional.

I. Simple Adversative.
(1) Positive statement or command after a negative.
(2) Denial of supposed condition and statement of true.
(3) Change in intention or action.

II. In Objections.
(1) Real objection to preceding remarks.
(2) Hypophora.
(3) Setting aside of objection or accusation.
(4) Resolve or exhortation to act despite objection or obstacle.

III. Transitional.
(1) Speech interrupted by appeal, or command.
(2) Speech intercepted by entrance of another person.
(3) Abrupt close of remarks or arguments owing to futility.
(4) Close of speech.
(5) (a) Dismissal of topic with ground for dismissal.
(b) Introduction of new topic.

I. Simple Adversative.

(1) ἀλλά γάρ introduces the positive of that which has been expressed in negative form immediately before.[1] In Il. XV. 739, for example, οὐ μέν τι σχεδόν ἐστι πόλις πύργοισ' ἀραρυῖα,/ ἣ κ' ἀπαμυναίμεσθ' ἑτεραλκέα δῆμον ἔχοντες·/ ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ Τρώων πεδίῳ πύκα θωρηκτάων, . . . ἑκὰς ἥμεθα πατρίδος αἴης·/τῷ ἐν χερσὶ φάος, οὐ μειλιχίῃ πολέμοιο;[2] the thought that the safety of the Achaeans rests in their valour is opposed to the previous negative statement that they have no other means of defense. Whether we consider that τῷ continues the interrupted ἀλλά clause, or, introduces a new sentence, the interpretation of the passage will not be materially changed. In the first case, ἀλλά and the following clause with τῷ, negate particularly the thought of the relative clause, ἣ κ' ἀπαμυναίμεσθ'. The γάρ clause confirms by describing the situation, which is the reverse of that depicted in the negative statement. Otherwise, ἀλλά must suggest some thought, such as " we are unprotected or alone", the natural consequence of which is expressed in the clause introduced by τῷ, that their safety depends upon themselves.

[1] Cf. Sem. Anth. Palat. VII. 507, where the ἀλλὰ γάρ is carelessly used as a mere formula to fill out the metre.

[2] Cf. Her. VII. 209, Aesch. Eun. 797, Arist. Thesm. 384, Plat. Symp. 180 A (an extension of this use), Charm. 166 C, Apol. 19 C. The Platonic examples illustrate ἀλλὰ γάρ juxtaposed and elliptical.

A prohibition, and a positive command are the contrasted, main ideas in Herod. VIII. 109. 18, *ἡμεῖς δέ . . . μὴ διώκωμεν ἄνδρας φεύγοντας. . . . . ἀλλ' εὖ γὰρ ἔχει ἐς τὸ παρεὸν ἡμῖν νῦν μὲν (ἄμεινον) ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι καταμείναντας ἡμέων τε αὐτῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι. . . .*[1] *ἐπεί* is occasionally substituted for *γάρ* e. g. Eur. Ion. 439, *Φοῖβος, τί πάσχει· παρθένους βίᾳ γαμῶν / προδίδωσι, παῖδας ἐκτεκνούμενος λάθρᾳ / / θνήσκοντας ἀμελεῖ. μὴ σύ γ'· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ κρατεῖς / ἀρετὰς δίωκε.*

Soph. Aj. 167 must be classified in this group, though the argument is somewhat obscured by a digression, *χἠμεῖς οὐδὲν σθένομεν πρὸς ταῦτ' / ἀπαλέξασθαι σοῦ χωρίς, ἄναξ. / ἀλλ' ὅτε γὰρ δὴ τὸ σὸν ὄμμ' ἀπέδραν, / παταγοῦσιν ἅπερ πτηνῶν ἀγέλαι. / μέγαν αἰγυπιὸν [δ'] ὑποδείσαντες / τάχ' ἄν, ἐξαίφνης εἰ σὺ φανείης, / σιγῇ πτήξειαν ἄφωνοι.* Of the variety of readings conjectured for this passage, that suggested by Dawes has been adopted, as involving the least change, and as most Sophoclean.[2] With this reading *γάρ* introduces the whole thought from *ὅτε γάρ . . .* to *ἄφωνοι.* The bare skeleton of the reasoning would be "we are helpless without you, but you must aid us, for, perchance, if you should appear, they would cower, dumb, in silence". *ὅτε . . . παταγοῦσιν* is not essential to the argument, although, dramatically, the simile, and the contrast of the present insolence with the future discomfiture of Ajax' foes, support effectively the appeal, which *ἀλλά* suggests.[3]

Jebb's rendering of *ἀλλά*, namely "we are helpless" has no exact parallel. Some definite, positive idea is always contained in the sentence introduced by *ἀλλά*, not a mere reiteration of the preceding negative thought. In Electra 307, which Jebb quotes in support of his theory, *κἀπιτηδεύειν κακά* conveys a distinct suggestion in contrast to *οὐ σωφρονεῖν.* Moreover, *σοῦ χωρίς* which is clearly a part of the sentence *οὐδὲν σθένομεν*, is disregarded in his interpretation. Yet the *γάρ* clause shows that the apodosis must contain some reference to Ajax' assistance, else, why the insistence on its value?

(2) Denial of supposed, and statement of true conditions by means of this group is illustrated in its ordinary form, by Herod. VI. 130. 6, *εἰ οἷόν τε εἴη, χαριζοίμην ἄν, μήτ' ἕνα ὑμέων ἐξαίρετον ἀποκρίνων. . . .*

[1] Cf. Il. XVII. 338, where *αἰδώς* makes the preceding clause, virtually a negative command. *τῷ* resumes.

[2] A list of the readings, with the arguments pro and con, is given in the appendix to Jebb's Ajax under this passage.

[3] Schneidewin's interpretation, in his edition of this play, is similar. Cf. Her. II. 139.

ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ οἷά τε ἐστι μιῆς πέρι παρθένου βουλεύοντα πᾶσι κατὰ νόον ποιέειν, τοῖσι μὲν ὑμέων ἀπελαυνομένοισι τοῦδε τοῦ γάμου τάλαντον ἀργυρίου ἑκάστῳ δωρεὴν δίδωμι. The γάρ clause contradicts the premise of the previous conditional statement, the ἀλλά introduces the altered conclusion. Greek method of expression, here, is full and exact—almost prolix. The real grammatical relation of the two clauses, cannot be mistaken. Transposition of the reason-sentence for which numerous parallels have been cited under anticipatory γάρ[1] is the only irregularity. But, examples of the complete expression, in natural order, are not wanting: e. g. Dem. Ol. Γ 15. εἰ γὰρ αὐτάρκη τὰ ψηφίσματ' ἦν, ἦ ὑμᾶς ἀναγκάζειν ἃ προσήκει πράττειν, . . . οὔτ' ἂν ὑμεῖς, πολλὰ ψηφιζόμενοι μικρά, μᾶλλον δ' οὐδὲν ἐπράττετε τούτων, οὔτε Φίλιππος τοσοῦτον ὑβρίκει χρόνον. . . . ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει· τὸ γὰρ πράττειν τοῦ λέγειν καὶ χειροτονεῖν ὕστερον ὂν τῇ τάξει, πρότερον τῇ δυνάμει καὶ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν.[2] Arist. De Coelo. 274 b 7, ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴπερ γε ἐκ πεπερασμένων ἔσται τὸ ἄπειρον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῶν μορίων ἕκαστον εἶναι ἄπειρον, . . . ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον. δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι οὔτε βάρος οὔτε κουφότης ἐστὶν ἄπειρος.[3] Aristotle's precise style of reasoning, forbade the frequent omission of logical links.[4] Where the more colloquial speech of drama or dialogue might have used the elliptical juxtaposed particles, Aristotle, with characteristic exactness, adopts the longer expression.

Occurrence of these expansions in writers so late as Demosthenes and Aristotle, proves that although ἀλλὰ γάρ in this sense had become so stereotyped, that the particles were written in juxtaposition, yet the full form had not grown obsolete.

In fact, throughout Greek literature all forms are found, from the full idiom to the incomplete. Herodotus, Isocrates and Plato afford, as will be seen, a majority of the examples, the incomplete predominating in the latter two. In drama it is extremely rare. The one instance in Homer shows the ἀλλά clause resumed after the interruption. Od. XIX. 591, εἴ κ' ἐθέλοις μοι, ξεῖνε, παρήμενος ἐν μεγάροισι/τέρπειν, οὔ κέ μοι ὕπνος ἐπὶ βλεφάροισι χυθείη./ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ πως ἔστιν ἀΰπνους ἔμμεναι αἰὲν/ἀνθρώπους· . . . . ἀλλ' ἦ τοι μὲν ἐγὼν ὑπερώιον εἰσαναβᾶσα/λέξομαι εἰς εὐνήν.[5] A slight departure is made from regular norm in that the

[1] Cf. p. 28.

[2] Cf. Lys. 13. 79 (similar expansion), and Dem. Phil. IV. 73.

[3] Cf. De Coelo 275 a 20, 276 b 13, 283 b 12, 321 a 17.

[4] Aristotle uses the elliptical formula only 6 times.

[5] Cf. Monroe, "the lines 591–3 are, perhaps, interpolated. The repetition of ἀλλά in 594 is suspicious". See, however, p. 64 for similar instance.

γάρ does not deny the premise, but another general condition, which the conclusion tacitly takes for granted. Such a thought as this, "but I cannot refrain from sleep", might complete the ἀλλά clause. ἀλλ' ἦ τοι . . . would then contain the positive thought, contrasted with the previous negative statement. An alternative explanation would be, that ἀλλ' ἦ τοι resumes the thought of the first adversative particle and gives, practically, the content of the ellipse.

Like resumption by δή is seen in Herod. V. 3. 5. εἰ δὲ ὑπ' ἑνὸς ἄρχοιτο ἥ φρονέοι κατὰ τὠυτό, ἄμαχόν τ' ἂν εἴη . . . ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἄπορόν σφι καὶ ἀμήχανον μή κοτε ἐγγένηται· εἰσὶ δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀσθενέες. Clearly the interpretation is not altered by the juxtaposition of the particles. The usual translation "but the truth is" expresses accurately the sense but not the syntax of the Greek sentence; because our idiom permits the omission of logical links, it is not safe to conclude that the same liberty can be taken with the Greek.

ἀλλά elliptical, but separated from γάρ is instanced in Herodotus II. 120. εἰ ἦν Ἑλένη ἐν Ἰλίῳ, ἀποδοθῆναι ἂν αὐτὴν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι . . (several lines down) ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ εἶχον Ἑλένην ἀποδοῦναι οὐδὲ λέγουσι αὐτοῖσι τὴν ἀληθείην ἐπίστευον οἱ Ἕλληνες.[1] Plat. Meno 94 E supplies an example of the juxtaposed, elliptical construction. καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν, καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν, ὥστε εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτόν, ἐξευρεῖν ἄν ὅστις ἔμελλεν αὐτοῦ τοὺς υἱεῖς ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσειν . . . . ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε Ἄνυτε μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτὸν ἀρετή.[2] (If virtue were teachable, he would have found someone who would make his children good. But, (he couldn't) for I fear it is not teachable.) The ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον of the Aristotle passage, might easily be inserted here.

γάρ had become so closely associated with ἀλλά in this usage, at the time of Plato, that even where the latter sentence was afterwards completed, γάρ still maintained its position: e. g. Plat. Phaedr. 228 Socrates had asked Phaedrus to repeat to him Lysias' speech but the other had protested that he could not memorize it, in so short a time. Socrates replies, Ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερά ἐστι τούτων, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι Λυσίου λόγον ἀκούων ἐκεῖνος οὐ μόνον ἅπαξ ἤκουσεν, ... The form is irregular. It is unusual for the γάρ clause to deny both

[1] Cf. Her. VIII. 108, Plat. Apol. 20 C, Charm. 165 B.

[2] Cf. Her. V. 3, VII. 143. 9, IX. 113, Isocr. 109 b–c, 147d. Plat. Lach. 200 D, Apol. 19 C, 25 C.

protasis and apodosis. But, *ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι* is really subordinate in thought, although not in construction. Both sentences might be thus paraphrased, "If I do not know Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself, and your statement is true . . . you have not had time to learn the speech of Lysias". Emphasis is laid on the latter conclusion. The other, a manifest impossibility is a mere substitution.[1]

Variations of this construction occur, but the analogy between the different forms, is clear throughout. By a slight extension of their use, the combined particles may contrast the actual conditions with those which the speaker represents as right (*ἄξιον ἦν, ἔχρην, ἐδει*), or more desirable (*πολλοῦ ἂν ἐποιησάμην*), or anticipated (*ᾤμην*):[2] e. g. Isoc. Antid. § 227, *ἐφ' οἷς ἄξιον ἦν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας φιλοτιμεῖσθαι . . . ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὕτω τινὲς ἀγνωμόνως ἔχουσιν ὥστ'* . . . Isoc. XII. 126 fg. *Περὶ οὗ πρὸ πολλοῦ ἂν ἐποιησάμην μὴ διειλέχθαι πρότερον περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς . . . ἀλλὰ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ἦν, μᾶλλον δ' ἀδύνατον,* . . . Id. XII. 20 fg. *ᾤμην γὰρ οὕτως ἐπιφανὴς εἶναι τοῖς ἀλυζονευομένοις πολεμῶν . . . ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἀλόγως ὠδυράμην ἐν ἀρχῇ τὴν ἀτυχίαν τὴν παρακολουθοῦσαν μοι . . .*

(3) The abandonment of a desire or enterprise may be denoted by *ἀλλὰ γάρ*. Contrast, is the predominant idea of *ἀλλά* here as in the preceding group; modes of action or plans adopted are contrasted with those desired, or attempted. The *γάρ* clause relates the failure or other reasons necessitating the change.

[1] Stalbaum thinks *ἀλλὰ γάρ*, as Lat. "at enim" is, for the sake of brevity, so used, that what is really adversative, has, at the same time, a causal force. He would transcribe thus, *ἀλλ' οὐδέτερα ἐστι τούτων· εὖ γὰρ οἶδα.* The *γὰρ* has been attracted to the *ἀλλά* sentence. Cf. Hoog. ad Viger p. 472 for a like explanation.

But, *εὖ οἶδα* is the main statement, and, this, we have seen, is always introduced by *ἀλλά*. Such an attraction as Stalbaum suggests, is unparalleled. The example cited by Hoog. viz. Arrian de Exp. Alex. lib. II. cap. 6, *μηκέτι Ἀλέξανδρον ἐθέλειν προιέναι τοῦ πρόσω· ἀλλ' ὀκνεῖν γὰρ πυνθανόμενον ὑτι αὐτὸς προσάγοι* is not apposite. *ἀλλά* introduces the positive of the negative statement, but conveys a thought similar to *ὀκνεῖν*. Consequently, it is tempting to construe *ἀλλ'* with *ὀκνεῖν*; but, *γάρ* cannot be read with *πυνθανόμενον*.

[2] Cf. Lys. Ed. Frohberger, Vol. I. p. 489, where a number of examples are quoted. Cf. Andoc. Myst. 23, Lys. XXII. III. 26, Isocr. 317 c, 228 d, 299 b, Dem. *Πρὸς Λεωχάρη* XLIV. 28, Plat. Apol. 19 D. Note the use of *ἐπειδὴ δέ* and *νῦν δέ* with expressions of expectation. When the first phrase is used, the *ἐπειδή* clause states the actual conditions, and *δέ* the changes in the course of action or circumstances which result. When *νῦν δέ* is used, the actual conditions are simply contrasted with those expected or desired: e. g. Lys. VII. 1, XXXI. 1, Plat. Apol. 36 A, Is. V. 1, II. 1, Isoc. XIX. 1.

The following variations of the formula, in reference to completeness of the ἀλλά sentence and separation of the two particles, occur:

(a) ἀλλὰ . . . γάρ, separated: e. g. Od. XIV. 355 which has already been quoted p. 57 and as a further illustration, Her. IX. 109. 17, *Ξέρξης δὲ παντοίος ἐγίνετο, οὐ βουλόμενος δοῦναι . . . ἀλλὰ πόλις τε ἐδίδου καὶ χρυσὸν . . . . ἀλλ', οὐ γὰρ ἔπειθε, διδοῖ τὸ φᾶρος.*[1]

(b) ἀλλὰ . . . γάρ, separated and elliptical: e. g. Od. X. 568, *τοῖσιν δὲ κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ. / ἑζόμενοι δὲ κατ' αὖθι γόων τίλλοντό τε χαίτας· / ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ τις πρῆξις ἐγίγνετο μυρομένοισιν· ἀλλ' ὅτε δή ῥ' ἐπὶ νῆα θοὴν καὶ θῖνα θαλάσσης / ἦομεν ἀχνύμενοι . . . .* Clearly, the reference of the γάρ clause is to the futility of their despair, in affecting Odysseus' purpose. With ἀλλά, if we wish to make explicit the adversative idea, there might be supplied "they consented to go", "yielded", or "ceased". In Bacchylides V. 168, the same γάρ clause with ἀλλά, is used in introducing a transition necessitated by the futility of further speech[2] The ἀλλά is completed. An expansion in regular order of an exactly parallel passage, Il. XXIV. 524, is still more conclusive evidence of the relation of the particles. *ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ κατ' ἄρ' ἕζε' ἐπὶ θρόνου, ἄλγεα δ' ἔμπης / ἐν θυμῷ κατακεῖσθαι ἐάσομεν ἀχνύμενοί περ. / οὐ γάρ τις πρῆξις πέλεται κρυεροῖο γόοιο.*

(c) ἀλλὰ γάρ, juxtaposed and elliptical: e. g. Plat. Theae. 148 E. *ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθ' ὦ Σώκ., πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτ' αὐτὸς δύναμαι πεῖσαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ἱκανῶς τι λέγω, ...*[3] Her. III. 152. 8, *καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ Κῦρος εἶλέ σφεας, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπειρήθη. ἀλλὰ γὰρ δεινῶς ἦσαν ἐν φυλακῇσι οἱ βαβυλώνιοι, οὐδέ σφεας οἷός τε ἦν ἑλεῖν.*[4]

Some kinship may be traced between this category and γάρ used in introducing a change in the course of events differing from what would have been naturally expected from the circumstances related in preceding sentences: e. g. Pind. Isth. III. 34, *ἱπποτρόφοι τ' ἐγένοντο, / χαλκέῳ τ' Ἄρει ἄδον. / ἀλλ' ἀμέρᾳ γὰρ ἐν μιᾷ / τραχεῖᾳ νιφὰς πολέμοιο τεσσάρων ἀνδρῶν ἐρήμωσεν μάκαιραν ἑστίαν·*[5] (They became rearers of horses, and, found favour with bronze-clad Ares,

[1] Cf. Od. V. 137, where ἔπει is substituted, quoted p. 57, Her. IV. 83. 7, Soph. Phil. 1020.

[2] Cf. Od. X. 202, XI. 393, Plat. Prot. 336 A.

[3] Cf. Isoc. 237 b, 418 a (pseudo), Xen. Cyr. VII. I. 49.

[4] Cf. Her. VII. 4, IX. 46.

[5] Cf. Pind. Pyth. IV. 32, Isth. III. 34, Ol. I. 55, Xen. Cyr. I. IV. 3.

but, (their good luck did not continue) for in one day the rough storm of war reft their happy hearth of four men.) Before dismissing this topic we should note the connection between the examples cited above and a few instances which are similar, except that they introduce no change in events, but, merely contradict an inference which might be drawn from the previous remarks: e. g. Eur. Cyc. 432, *ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔνδον σὸς πατὴρ ταδ' ἤνεσεν. / ἀλλ' ἀσθενὴς γὰρ κἀποκερδαίνων ποτοῦ / . . . σὺ δέ, νεανίας γὰρ εἶ. / σώθητι μετ' ἐμοῦ . . .*,[1] (but he will not aid me, as it seemed probable from his approval, for he is weak and drunk; but do you, for you are young).

II. In Objections.

That this is a derivative, not an original use of *ἀλλά-γάρ*—a branch late-developed from the adversative, is evidenced by its absence in Homer. Other facts point toward this conclusion: from the first (Herod.), *ἀλλὰ γάρ* appears in the elliptical juxtaposed form; the completed formula is rarely found, except in some later analogous expansions.

An ellipse is quite natural. Merely an expression of the speaker's objection, which is conveyed plainly enough by the objecting *ἀλλά*, and the grounds advanced in the subjoined clause, would be contained in the main sentence if completed. Happy illustration of the nature of the ellipse, in its simplest form is given by Arist. Wasps 356 ΧΟΡ. *μέμνησαι δῆθ', ὅτ' ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς κλέψας ποτὲ τοὺς ὀβελίσκους / ἴεις σαυτὸν κατὰ τοῦ τείχους ταχέως, ὅτε Νάξος ἑάλω; / ΦΙΛ. οἶδ'· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτ'; οὐδὲν γὰρ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνῳ προσόμοιον.* No rigid formula of completion can be applied to all instances. The context necessitates slight variations. But the fundamental feeling of *ἀλλά* and its relation to *γάρ* are always the same.

In early writers, the usage under discussion is rare. One instance only is met in Herodotus, and but few in the drama. Under the technical form of hypophora, it becomes common in the orators; but Plato, more than any other, made it his own. Xenophon and Aristotle continued its use, yet in a more limited degree.

(1) Real Objection.

ἀλλὰ γάρ expresses disapproval of a remark, or suggests some obstacle against the compliance with a suggestion. Concession of the partial truth of what has been said anticipates the objection.

[1] Cf. Plat. Tim. 94 E. Prot. 310 E. Cf. a like Shakespearean use of "but for" Sonnet. 54. 9. The canker-blooms have full as deep a dye/as the perfumed tincture of the roses/ . . . . But, for their virtue only is their show/ They live unwoo'd and unrespected fade/Die to themselves.

Arist. Nub. 798 has instanced the complete formulas: ΣΤΡ. ἀλλ' ἔστ' ἔμοιγ' υἱὸς καλός τε κἀγαθός· / ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθέλει γὰρ μανθάνειν, τί ἐγὼ πάθω; The elliptical form, such as is found in Plat. Euthyph. 6 D, is the more common. ΕΥΘ. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔλεγον, ὦ Σώκ. ΣΩΚ. Ἴσως, ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ φῂς εἶναι ὅσια.[1] (Euthph. Yes, and what I said was true, Socrates. Soc. Perhaps, but what of that, (Cf. supra ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτ';) for you say, that many other things, also, are holy.) To make clear the grammatical relation, I have put into words the idea of objection in ἀλλά, but, in a literary translation, it would be as unnecessary, as it was in the original, to supply them. In fact, English idiom would omit the symbol of the logical connection between the objection and the reason, and, introduce the latter by an adversative particle.

Following the γάρ clause, and containing the inference to be drawn therefrom, in Plat. Sym. 199 A, is a sentence introduced by a conclusive particle. Its thought is similar to that suggested by the ἀλλά. καὶ καλῶς γ' ἔχει καὶ σεμνῶς ὁ ἔπαινος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἤδη τὸν τρόπον τοῦ ἐπαίνου, οὐδ' εἰδὼς ὑμῖν ὡμολόγησα καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐπαινέσεσθαι. ἡ γλῶττα οὖν ὑπέσχετο, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὔ· χαιρέτω δή. (The encomium is very fine, and impressive, but, still I object to fulfilling my promise, for I did not understand the kind of encomium, and I agreed without knowledge. The tongue has promised but not the mind. So, let it go.)

(2) Hypophora (or Prolepsis).

Hypophora, a rhetorical artifice, by which an orator anticipates and forestalls an objection which his opponent may raise, is well known to Greek literary critics. Arist. Rhet. II. 25, discusses it under the technical term λύσις.

ἴσως is often added, to indicate the hypothetical character of the objection. As in the case of the real objection, the idea conveyed by the ἀλλά is so obvious that it is rarely given verbal expression.[2] On the other hand, there is shown, also, a tendency toward the method of abbreviation characteristic of the modern languages. By a kind of logical ellipse γάρ is omitted and the

[1] Cf. Eur. Hipp. 923, Arist. Plut. 425, Plat. Pol. 262 B (note concessive μέν), 263 A., Phaed. 87 D, 95 C, 102 B, Phil. 43 A, 49 C, 12 B, Gorg. 448 D, 517 B, Euthyph. 9 C, Theae. 176 B, Rep. 471 C, 487 B, Laws 707 C, 709 B, 839 C, [Epin.] 987 B, Hip. Maj. 291 E, 300 C, 301 B, Xen. An. VII. III. 47, Mem. II. I. 17.

[2] Seyffert, Schol. Lat. p. 240, believes that it is unnecessary to supply an ellipse in the Greek. ἀλλά suggests the objection, and the context shows whether it is a real or a supposed objection. Cf. Blass, Vol. II, p. 173 b.

reason for the objection is blended with the objection, introduced by ἀλλά.

By no means confined to the orators,[1] instances of hypophora are found in the historians and philosophers: e. g. Her. VI. 124, *Ἀλκμεωνίδαι δὲ ἐμφανέως ἠλευθέρωσαν, εἰ δὴ οὗτοί γε ἀληθέως ἦσαν οἱ τὴν Πυθίην ἀναπείσαντες προσημαίνειν . . . ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως τι ἐπιμεμφόμενοι Ἀθηναίων τῷ δήμῳ προεδίδοσαν τὴν πατρίδα.*[2] Herodotus suggests the possible objection, the Alcmeonidae may have betrayed their native land, in revenge for some wrong done them by the people.

The idiom suffers many variations. By a clever turn, the orators employ it to enhance the weakness of their opponents position. Attention is called to the utter absence of grounds for defense or accusation, by bringing forward, point by point, under the form of supposed objections the possible reasons for acquittal or condemnation: e. g. Lys. XII. 40. *ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅπλα τῶν πολεμίων ἐσκύλευσαν τοσαῦτα ὅσα περ ὑμῶν ἀφείλοντο;*

Similarly, in the same oration of Lysias, the accuser leads up to the punishment that he claims to be due, by suggesting other possible punishments, the inadequacy of which he at once proceeds to prove. § 83 *ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰ τὰ χρήματα τὰ φανερὰ δημεύσαιτε, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι ἢ τῇ πόλει, ἧς οὗτοι πολλὰ εἰλήφασιν, ἢ τοῖς ἰδιώταις, ὧν οἰκίας ἐξεπόρθησαν;* In both the instances cited, the function of *ἀλλὰ γάρ* is closely allied to that in the transitional use which will be discussed in the next chapter, in that it introduces a new possibility in a series of supposed objections. If its function in the series be considered, the transitional idea is uppermost, if the import of the group in its own sentence be taken into account, the same interpretation must follow as above.

(3) *ἀλλὰ γάρ* may be used in setting aside as well as in advancing an objection. The rejection takes the form of either (a) a justification of the argument or act criticized, or, (b) a resolve to persist despite the objection or obstacle suggested. No other comment is needed on the nature of the ellipse after *ἀλλά* than the expansion in regular order in Aristotle De Coelo 281 a 24 *μηδὲν δ' ἡμᾶς παρενοχλείτω·*[3] *διωρίσθω γὰρ κατὰ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς τὸ τέλος λεγόμενον τὸ κυρίως δυνατόν. τάχα γὰρ ἐνσταίη τις ἄν ὡς οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ λεχθέν· ὁ γὰρ*

[1] Cf. Andoc. Agst. Alc. 37, [Lys.] VI. 48, 40, Isoc. 77 b, 132 c–d, 230 d, 391 d. Dem. XVII. 7.

[2] Cf. Xen. Anab. V. VII. 8, VII. VII 35, Plat. Rep. 365 C, 366 A, Men. 94 D.

[3] This is another form used in rejecting.

ὁρῶν στάδιον οὐ καὶ τά ἐντὸς ὄψεται μεγέθη, . . . ἀλλ' οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον. διωρίσθω γὰρ ἤτοι ἐπὶ τῆς δυνάμεως. . . .[1]

Plat. Soph. 227 A may be cited as an instance of the common elliptical form justifying an argument to which exception is taken. *καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων, ὧν γναφευτικὴ καὶ ξύμπασα κοσμητικὴ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν παρεχομένη κατὰ σμικρὰ πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα δοκοῦντα ὀνόματα ἔσχεν.* ΘΕΑΙ. *Μάλα γε.* ΞΕ. *παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ θεαίτητε. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς . . . οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον . . . .*[2]

Various modifications of the objecting sense are admitted. ἀλλὰ γάρ sometimes introduces the alleviating circumstances after an acknowledgment of ground for complaint or sorrow: e. g. Soph. O. C. 1615, *ὅλωλε γὰρ δὴ πάντα τἀμά, κοὐκέτι / τὴν δυσπόνητον ἕξετ' ἀμφ' ἐμοὶ τροφήν· / σκληρὰν μέν, οἶδα, παῖδες· ἀλλ' ἓν γὰρ μόνον / τὰ πάντα λύει ταῦτ' ἔπος μοχθήματα.*[3]

Likewise, a request for pardon accompanied by a partial justification of the act censured, may be placed in adversative relation to a preceding confession: e. g. Soph. El. 256, *αἰσχύνομαι μέν, ὦ γυναῖκες, εἰ δοκῶ / . . . δυσφορεῖν ὑμῖν ἄγαν. / ἀλλ' ἡ βία γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀναγκάζει με δρᾶν, / αὐγγνωτε·*[4]

There is another use of ἀλλὰ γάρ, rather unique in character, yet frequent enough to be recognized as a distinct category. Though not paralleled by any of the above classes it is somewhat akin to the ἀλλὰ γάρ setting aside an objection, and, might have arisen from it through extended analogy. A speaker, after a remark, which would appear to his hearer strange or unusual, forestalls an expression of surprise by explaining how the fact mentioned was possible or reasonable. Eur. Med. 1085 *πολλάκις ἤδη / διὰ λεπτοτέρων μύθων ἔμολον . . . . / ἢ χρὴ γενεὰν θῆλυν ἐρευνᾶν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔστιν μοῦσα καὶ ἡμῖν, . . .*, (Often ere this, have I entered into deeper problems, than was meet for the race of women to inquire into. But [it is not strange], for we, also, have a muse.) Pind. Ol. VI. 53, *τοὶ δ' οὔτ' ὢν ἀκοῦσαι / οὔτ' ἰδεῖν εὔχοντο πεμπταῖον γεγενημένον. αλλ' ἐν / κέκρυπτο γὰρ σχοίνῳ βατείᾳ τ' ἐν ἀπειράτῳ, / ἴων ξανθαῖσι καὶ παμπορφύροις ἀκτῖσι*

[1] Cf. Arist. Pol. 1275 a 29.

[2] Cf. Laws 746 B, 805 B, Soph. 227 A.

[3] Cf. Soph. O. C. 985, 988. Cf. Isocr. 89 b, 278 d, e, extenuating circumstances after an expression of censure. Cf. Dem. 58-63, the speaker offers an ironical excuse for the action of his opponents.

[4] Cf. id. 619, O. C. 755, Isoc. 258 e, (elliptical) 250 a, (el.) 269 b, (el.).

βεβρεγμένος ἀβρὸν / σῶμα·[1] The author foreseeing the surprise and doubt which might be aroused by the statement τοὶ δ' . . . εὔχοντο anticipates this feeling, by an objection (ἀλλά) and confirms the truth of his assertion, by relating the circumstances which made it probable.

As stated on p. 67 there is another type of rejecting ἀλλὰ γάρ. After admitting that a certain method of conduct is open to censure, the speaker announces his resolve to persist in despite. γάρ motivates the determination : e. g. Soph. El. 223, δεινοῖς ἠναγκάσθην, δεινοῖς· / ἔξοιδ', οὐ λάθει μ' ὀργά. / ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ δεινοῖς οὐ σχήσω / ταύτας ἅτας / ὅφρα με βίος ἔχῃ.[2]

In this same classification, may be included the use of this group to introduce a resolve or exhortation to undertake a proposed task, despite the obstacles, which must be encountered. The completed formula is found Soph. Phil. 81, ἔξοιδα, παῖ, φύσει σε μὴ πεφυκότα / τοιαῦτα φωνεῖν μηδὲ τεχνᾶσθαι κακά· / ἀλλ' ἡδὺ γάρ τι κτῆμα τῆς νίκης λαβεῖν, / τόλμα·[3] After the example just quoted, it is not difficult to supply the ellipse in Plat. Rep. 432 D, ἔστι γοῦν σκοτεινὸς καὶ δυσδιερεύνητος· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅμως ἰτέον.[4] Laws 751 D, is worthy of note. The thought of the ἀλλά sentence is resumed by a καὶ δὴ καί, applying the proverb, which is quoted as a reason. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀγῶνα προφάσεις οὗ φασι δέχεσθαι· καὶ δὴ καὶ σοὶ τοῦτο νῦν καὶ ἐμοὶ ποιητέον. In Arist. Acharn. 403, ἀλλ' ὅμως followed by the act composes the main sentence. There can be no question about the relation of elliptical ἀλλά and the γάρ clause. ΔΙΚ. ὦ τρισμακάρι' Εὐριπίδη, / ὅθ' ὁ δοῦλος οὑτωσὶ σοφῶς ὑποκρίνεται. / ἐκκάλεσον αὐτόν. ΚΗΦ. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον. ΔΙΚ. ἀλλ' ὅμως. / οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἀπέλθοιμ', ἀλλὰ κόψω τὴν θύραν. / Εὐριπίδη, ...[5]

[1] Fennel supplies an ellipse which is merely a repetition of the preceding sentence, "But, though he was five days old, no one had heard or seen him, for . . . .". The force of the ἀλλὰ γὰρ would, by this interpretation, be very unusual. Gildersleeve's suggestion, "But in vain, for . . . .", while a very common ellipse in other uses of ἀλλὰ γάρ is not apposite here. Cf. example like the just cited, Isocr. 181 C.

[2] Cf. Lys. XII. 61, Plat. Theae. 196 D. (ὅμως δ'—γάρ), Rep. 595 C, Xen. Cyr. II. I. 13.

[3] Cf. Pind. Pyth. I. 85, Eur. I. T. 118 (complete.)

[4] Archil. Anth. Lyr. Bergk 9 (55), And. Myst. 22, Lys. XXXIV. 10, Arist. Acharn. 738 (separated but elliptical), Plat. Critias 108 C, Tim. 53 C, Theae. 191 C, Rep. 607 C, Laws 636 A, Arist. Pol. 1275 B.

[5] Cf. id. 408 ἀλλ' ὅμως is used without any γάρ clause in a sense similar to that in 403.

III. Transitional.

The adversative signification of ἀλλά, which is here lightly touched, arrests the attention and prepares for an interruption or change in the line of thought. As a matter of course, then, the transitional idea suggested by the ἀλλά is seldom couched in so many words. The act, the pausing, or, in many instances, the closing of the speech is sufficient.

When introducing a new objection in a series of objections, the function of the group is so indissolubly connected with that indicating an objection, that it is impossible to determine which should be considered the paramount meaning of the group in the passage in question.[1]

Although found in Homer, and authors of early period with some frequency, ἀλλὰ γάρ becomes in the orators an almost invariable formula, for connecting the different points of argument, and closing an oration.

(1) ἀλλὰ γάρ interrupting a speech to introduce an appeal or command, is one of the simplest types of this usage. This, commonly called, ἀλλά of appeal, is used frequently with an imperative alone. Its function is, in effect, to introduce an appeal, but, by the adversative feeling always associated, it connotes a contrast between the preceding and subsequent speech. From its very nature the purpose of the interruption must be distinctly stated. Consequently, there is less variation in this class than in the others.

Many instances of the natural order—the completed γάρ following the completed ἀλλά clause are met with, but, as these are not usually included under the ἀλλὰ γάρ combination, only a few passages as parallels are cited: e. g. Med. 133, ἀλλά, γεραιά / λέξον· ἐπ' ἀμφιπύλου γὰρ ἔσω μελάθρου γόον ἔκλυον[2]. Analogous instances are found with ἐπεί: e. g. Soph. O. C. 1405, ὦ τοῦδ' ὅμαιμοι παῖδες, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς, ἐπεὶ / τὰ σκληρὰ πατρὸς κλύετε τοῦδ' ἀρωμένου, / μή τοί με πρὸς θεῶν σφὼ γ' . . . μή μ' ἀτιμάσητε γε, . . .[3] The normal form is illustrated in Aj. 328. Tecmessa has been describing the strange conduct of Ajax, but, suddenly remembering the purpose of her coming, says, ἀλλ' ὦ φίλοι, τούτων γὰρ εἵνεκ' ἐστάλην, / ἀρῆξατ' εἰσελθόντες . . . .

[1] Cf. Hypophora p. 67.

[2] Cf. Soph. O. C. 500, 1201, 1284, 1776-9, O. R. 297, 1429, Arist. Lys. 547 637.

[3] Cf. Id. 237, O. R. 1503.

In Homer Il. XIII. 228, a conclusive τῷ resumes the intercepted ἀλλά sentence. ἀλλὰ, Θόαν, καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάρος μενεδήιος ἦσθα,/ ὀτρύνεις δὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅθι μεθιέντα ἴδηαι'/ τῷ νῦν μήτ' ἀπόληγε κέλευέ τε φωτὶ ἑκάστῳ.[1] Complete reversals of the regular order are instanced by this same author. ἀλλά introducing the exhortation follows the γάρ clause: e. g. Od. X. 174, "ὦ φίλοι, οὐ γάρ πω καταδυσόμεθ' ἀχνύμενοί περ/ εἰς Ἀίδαο δόμους, πρὶν μόρσιμον ἦμαρ ἐπέλθῃ./ ἀλλ' ἄγετ', . . .[2]

(2) Approach of a new character is usually announced by some one on the stage, in Greek drama. This serves the double purpose of closing the conversation and informing the audience of the title of a new person. Here, again, the dramatists find the transitional ἀλλὰ γάρ a convenient medium. If completed, the ἀλλά, sentence contains a declaration of the speaker's intention to be silent, or to perform some other action which brings to an end the dialogue. Yet, frequently, the cessation of the speech is the sole hint of the thought of the particle.

To evidence the fact that all forms, from complete to elliptical, were in good usage in the same period of Greek literature, it is not necessary to repeat the examples quoted earlier in this paper.

In the first dramatists, this idiom in rarely employed, but, in Euripides and Aristophanes it has become a stereotyped expression, like καὶ μήν for announcing a new arrival.

(a) ἀλλὰ γάρ, separated and complete, e. g. Eur. Hipp. 52, ἀλλ' εἰσορῶ γὰρ τόνδε παῖδα Θησέως/ στείχοντα θήρας μόχθον ἐκλελοιπότα,/ Ἱππόλυτον, ἔξω τῶνδε βήσομαι τόπων.[3] In Arist. Acharn. 175, the greeting is the completion of the sentence. οἴμοι τάλας, μυττωτὸν ὅσον ἀπώλεσα./ ἀλλ' ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος γάρ Ἀμφίθεος ὁδί./χαῖρ', Ἀμφίθεε.[4]

(b) ἀλλὰ-γάρ, separated and elliptical: e. g. Aesch. Prom. 941, δαμὸν γὰρ οὐκ ἄρξει θεοῖς./Ἀλλ' εἰσορῶ γὰρ τόνδε τὸν Διὸς τρόχιν, . . .[5]

(c) ἀλλὰ γάρ, juxtaposed and elliptical: e. g. Plat. Theae. 144 C. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοὔνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὔ. ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐστι τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ. ἀλλὰ σκόπει, εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτόν. (As Campbell (Ed. of Theaetetus) notes on this passage, the second ἀλλά puts definitely forward the proposition for which the first has cleared the way.)

[1] Cf. Soph. O. C. 1267. Eur. El. 391, Heracl. 770, Arist. Lys. 140, 547, 1239, Thesm. 264, Theoc. Id. V. 29.

[2] Cf. Od. X. 226, XXIII. 248, and other instances given under antic. γάρ p. 29.

[3] Cf. Hel. 1385, Hec. 724, El. 107, Ion. 392, Arist. Lys. (complete and in regular order), 1239 (a question equivalent to a command completes ἀλλά).

[4] Cf. id. Eccl. 951, Eur. Bacch. 1165.

[5] Cf. Soph. Ant. 155, Eur. Or. 725, Her. Main. 138, 442, Arist. Birds 1169, Acharn. 40.

(d) *ἀλλὰ γάρ*, juxtaposed and complete: e. g. Aesch. Sept. 861, *Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤκουσ' αἴδ' ἐπὶ πρᾶγος/πικρὸν Ἀντιγόνη τ' ἠδ' Ἰσμήνη,/θρῆνον ἀδελφοῖν· οὐκ ἀμφιβόλως/οἶμαί σφ' . . . ἥσειν ἄλγος ἐπάξιον.*[1]

Some punctuate with a semi-colon after *ἀδελφοῖν* but this leaves a marked asyndeton in the next sentence.

(3) Tragedy and comedy employ *ἀλλὰ γάρ* with dramatic effect to break off abruptly a display of emotion or a tirade of passion and introduce a calmer mood. Avowal of shame, or, lament over the unseemly character or the futility of the outburst is contained in the *γάρ* clause. Rhetorical use is made of this same device by prose writers, occasionally, in discontinuing an argument or debate, which they wish to represent as fruitless or untimely. In illustration note the following:

(a) *ἀλλά* sentence completed: e. g. Eur. El. 1245, *δίκαια μὲν νῦν ἥδ' ἔχει· σὺ δ' οὐχὶ δρᾷς,/Φοῖβός τε Φοῖβος—ἀλλ' ἄναξ γάρ ἐστ' ἐμός,/σιγῶ·* (Electra's reverence overcomes her passion and she checks herself in the midst of her denunciation of Apollo), and Eur. Med. 1344, where a sense of the futility of anger checks further abuse, *ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἄν σε μυρίοις ὀνείδεσι/δάκοιμι· τοιόνδ' ἐμπέφυκέ σοι θράσος·/ἔρρ'.*[2]

(b) *ἀλλὰ γάρ*, separated and elliptical: e. g. Soph. Trach. 552, *ταῦτ' οὖν φοβοῦμαι μὴ πόσις μὲν Ἡρακλῆς/ἐμὸς καλῆται, τῆς νεωτέρας δ' ἄρ'/ἦ./ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἶπον, ὀργαίνειν καλὸν/γυναῖκα νοῦν ἔχουσαν· ἦ δ' ἔχω, φίλαι . . .*.[3] (*ἀλλά* introduces a new turn in the speech suggested by a nobler thought).

(c) *ἀλλά γάρ*, juxtaposed and complete: e. g. Eur. Tro. 444, *ἀλλὰ γὰρ τί τοὺς Ὀδυσσέως ἐξακοντίζω πόνους;/στεῖχ' ὅπως τάχιστ'· ἐς Ἅιδου νυμφίῳ γαμώμεθα./* (Close similarity of this to Medea 1344 and other instances where *ἀλλά* is separated from the *γάρ* and completed, support the construing of former with *στεῖχ'*. Still it is possible to treat it as an ordinary elliptical *ἀλλά γάρ*.)

(d) *ἀλλὰ γάρ*, juxtaposed and elliptical: e. g. Lys. II. 77. *Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι δεῖ τοιαῦτα ὀλοφύρεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἐλανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὄντες θνητοί·*[4] Plat. Hip. Maj. 304 E, *συμβέβηκε δή μοι, ὅπερ λέγω, κακῶς μὲν ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἀκούειν . . ., ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον ὑπομένειν ταῦτα πάντα· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὠφελοίμην.*

[1] Cf. Eur. Phoen. 1307, quoted on p. 54.

[2] Cf. Soph. O. R. 1409, 1429, (in regular order), O. C. 624, 797, Eur. Med. 252, Rhes. 106, Phoen., 891, Lys. VI. 50, Bacchyl. Carm. V. 162.

[3] Cf. Her. IX. 27, Soph. El. 595, Eur. Tro. 706, Phoen. 1762.

[4] Cf. Xen. Cyr. V. V. 13, Oec. VIII. 2, Plat. Alc. 114. A, Theocr. Carm. V. 44.

(4) For closing a speech, *ἀλλὰ γάρ* is a common formula. Its conventional character is evident in the survey of a few typical instances: e. g. Xen. An. V. VII. 11, *ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀρκεῖ περὶ τουτῶν τὰ εἰρημένα.* Plat. Ap. 42 A, *ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ.*[1] Of this nature is the only example of the transitional use that occurs in Homer: e. g. Il. VII. 242, *οἶδα δ' ἐνὶ σταδίῃ δηίῳ μέλπεσθαι Ἄρηι./ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ σ' ἐθέλω βαλέειν τοιοῦτον ἐόντα/λάθρῃ ὀπιπεύσας, ἀλλ' ἀμφαδόν, αἴ κε τύχωμι.*[2] Signal for action is given by *ἀλλά* while the *γάρ* clause explains why Hector thus warns his opponent. As in Il. III. 103, the actual tale of woe constitutes the main clause to an *ἀλλά*, so the attack here completes the same particle. If we accept the affirmative sense of *γάρ*, the relation of this sentence to what goes before, is obscure. *ἀλλά* cannot, then, be adversative, for, what precedes is simply an account of Achilles' prowess, and has no suggestion of secret attack, with which *ἐθέλω βαλέειν . . . ὀμφαδόν* might be contrasted. Completion of a sentence by action is paralleled in Il. XXI. 487–9, where the main sentence of a condition is otherwise unexpressed.

(5) *ἀλλὰ γάρ* affords a means of transition from topic to topic. Within this group, may be made the following distinctions, based on the content of the *γάρ* clause: (a) *ἀλλά* warns the hearers of the dismissal of the present topic, while *γάρ* advances the reasons, and the following sentence introduces the new subject, (b) *ἀλλά* arrests the attention of the hearer, and prepares him for a break in the course of the speech, *γάρ* introduces a statement of the new topic.

(a) The syntax of the two clauses, in this form of transition, and their logical relation to each other and immediate context, can be deduced from one or two expansions: e. g. Aesch. Prom. 441, *καίτοι θεοῖσι τοῖς νέοις τούτοις γέρα/τίς ἄλλος ἢ 'γὼ παντελῶς διώρισεν; /ἀλλ' αὐτὰ σιγῶ· καὶ γὰρ εἰδυίαισιν ἂν/ὑμῖν λέγοιμι.*[3] There is a variety in points of order and completeness in the group under discussion, similar to that found in the previous divisions:

(*a*) *ἀλλὰ . . . γάρ* separated and complete, Her. I. 14, *ἀλλ' οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἔργον ἐγένετο βασιλεύσαντος δυῶν δέοντα τεσσεράκοντα ἔτεα, τοῦτον μὲν παρήσομεν τοσαῦτα ἐπιμνησθέντες.*

[1] Cf. Lys. XII. 99, Isocr. 345 c, Xen. An. III. II. 32, VII. VII. 43, Cyr. VIII. VII. 26, Oec. XII. 1.

[2] Doederlein's suggestion of a gesture following the *ἀλλά* is apposite here.

[3] Cf. Soph. Phil. 11, (*ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν τί δεῖ λέγειν; ἀκμὴ γὰρ οὐ μακρῶν ἡμῖν λόγων.*)

(β) ἀλλὰ . . . γὰρ separated and elliptical: e. g. Eur. Med. 1301, *πέποιθ' ἀποκτείνασα κοιράνους χθονὸς/ἀθῷος αὐτὴ τῶνδε φεύξεσθαι δόμων; ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ αὐτῆς φροντίδ' ὡς τέκνων ἔχω·*[1]

(γ) ἀλλὰ γάρ, juxtaposed and complete: e. g. Soph. Ant. 148, *Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἁ μεγαλώνυμος ἦλθε Νίκα/τᾷ πολυαρμάτῳ ἀντιχαρεῖσα Θήβᾳ/ἐκ μὲν δὴ πολέμων/τῶν νῦν θέσθε λησμοσύναν, . . .*[2]

(δ) ἀλλὰ γάρ, juxtaposed and elliptical: e. g. Pind. Nem. VII. 52, *Αἴγινα, τεῶν Διός τ' ἐκγόνων θρασύ μοι τόδ' εἰπεῖν/φαενναῖς ἀρεταῖς ὁδὸν κυρίαν λόγων/οἴκοθεν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀνάπαυσις ἐν παντὶ γλυκεῖα ἔργῳ*[3] also, in making a transition from a digression to the main subject, Isocr. 155 c, *Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἦν ἐπακολουθῶ τοῖς ἐνοῦσιν ἐπιτιμῆσαι καὶ κατηγορῆσαι τῶν ἐνεστώτων πραγμάτων, δέδοικα, μὴ πόρρω λίαν τῆς ὑπαθέσεως ἀποπλανηθῶ.*[4]

Under this same subdivision must be classified those instances where the argument is dismissed by a brief and emphatic summary of the true facts of the case: e. g. Lys. XXV. 17, *καὶ μὲν δή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, μεγίστην ἡγοῦμαι περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ πίστιν δεδωκέναι. ὅστις γὰρ τοτε . . . . ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιαύτην διὰ τέλους γνώμην ἔχω, ὥστε ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ μὲν μὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δὲ τὰ ὄντα προθύμως εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀναλίσκειν.*[5] After ἀλλά a question such as *τί δεῖ μακρολογεῖν* might be supplied.

ἀλλὰ γάρ Plat. Theae. 196 E introduces the climax, as it were, of a series of arguments and so removes the necessity for further debate. *Ἔπειτ' οὐκ ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷόν ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμέν ἀνάπλεῳ τοῦ 'μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι.* Another variation appears in Herod. I. 147, where the author dismisses the discussion, by setting aside the question of the real truth and granting the claim made for the sake of the argument. *ἀλλὰ γὰρ περιέχονται τοῦ οὐνόματος μᾶλλόν τι τῶν ἄλλων Ἰώνων, ἔστωσαν δὴ καὶ οἱ καθαρῶς γεγονότες Ἴωνες.*

[1] Cf. Thucy. VI. 77. 1.

[2] It is possible to supply after *ἀλλά* some thought like (But let us say no more of our sorrows, for . . .). *τῶν νῦν* would be a continuation of the theme of the *ἀλλά* clause. The explanation given above does not differ in thought, while it has the advantage of removing the unnecessary asyndeton.

[3] Cf. Isth. VI. 16, Nem. VII. 30, Lys. VII. 42, XXIV. 21, Isocr. 111 b, 175 a, 187 b, 415 c, Dem. De Cor. § 263, Arist. Pol. 1264 a 36, De Gen. et Cor. 333 a 3. It is worthy of note that the sentence following which introduces the new topic, often begins with a resumptive *δέ* or *οὖν*—sometimes combined with *λοιπόν*: e. g. Gorg. Pal. 32 (*δέ*), Lys. VII. 9, Isocr. 356 b, 382 a, (*δέ*) Antid. 215 (*οὖν*), Plat. Apol. 28 A (*δέ*) Arist. Pol. 1323 b 36 (*δέ*).

[4] Cf. id. 250 d, 345 c, Dem. De Cor. 42, 211, (note resumption with *δε*).

[5] Cf. Isoc. 169 b, 419 a, Plat. Apol. 419 a, 25 C, 26 A, Rep. 598 C.

(b) Less common is that form of transition in which *ἀλλὰ γάρ* clause abruptly introduces the new topic; it is usually elliptical.

A passage showing the completed formula makes indubitable what thought is conveyed by the elliptical *ἀλλά*, e. g., Lys. XIII. 79, *ἀλλ' ἕτερον· οὔτε γὰρ συσσιτήσας τούτῳ οὐδεὶς φανήσεται . . . ἕτερον* introduces the argument to which *γάρ* refers. How aptly the completed sentence in the above passage expresses the thought suggested by *ἀλλὰ* in the elliptical examples may be seen from Andoc. Myst. 124, *Ὡς δ' ἀληθῆ λέγω, καλεῖ μοι τοὺς μάρτυρας.* . . . ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ . . . *Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τοῦτον, ᾧ λαχεῖν ἠξίωσε τῆς Ἐπίλυκου θυγατρός, σκέψασθε πῶς γέγονεν, καὶ πῶς ἐποιήσατ' αὐτόν.*[1]

[1] Cf. id. 128, 130, 132, Isoc. 169 b, 264 b (not exactly similar, *ἀλλὰ γάρ* takes up a topic which has been merely mentioned, and, introduces a further confirmation on the ground, that what has been said is not enough) Eur. Ion. (*ἀλλὰ γάρ* separated) Med. 1067, Xen. Hist. VII. III. 4, Plat. Meno 92 C, Phaedr. 261 C, Pol. 257 C, Ion. 541 E, (*ἀλλὰ γάρ* separated) Dem. XV. 34.